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GERRYMANDERING AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
NORM AGAINST GOVERNMENT PARTISANSHIP
Michael S. Kang*
This Article challenges the basic premise in the law of gerrymandering that
partisanship is a constitutional government purpose at all. The central problem, Justice Scalia once explained in Vieth v. Jubilerer, is that partisan gerrymandering becomes unconstitutional only when it “has gone too far,” giving
rise to the intractable inquiry into “how much is too much.” But the premise
that partisanship is an ordinary and lawful purpose, articulated confidently as
settled law and widely understood as such, is largely wrong as constitutional
doctrine. The Article surveys constitutional law to demonstrate the vitality of
an important, if implicit norm against government partisanship across a variety of settings. From political patronage, to government speech, to election
administration and even in redistricting itself, Vieth is the exception in failing
to bar tribal partisanship as a legitimate state interest in lawmaking.
The puzzle therefore is why the Supreme Court in Vieth diverged from this
overarching norm for legislative redistricting where the need for government
nonpartisanship is most acute and so rarely met. The Article proposes a new
approach focused on legitimate state interest and partisan purpose, building
on a constitutional norm against government partisanship. The importance of
consolidating and reifying this norm, in its most salient legal context, cannot
be overstated at a time when hyperpolarization between the major parties
dominates national politics and is at its most severe in our lifetime.
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Introduction
Gerrymandering for partisan advantage is so well ingrained that Justice
O’Connor once remarked that refusal by politicians in charge of redistricting
to seek party advantage should be grounds for impeachment.1 The routine,
historical entanglement of partisanship with redistricting long discouraged
courts from entertaining constitutional claims against partisan gerrymandering. Even after the Supreme Court declared the justiciability of such
claims, it has since stumbled to articulate a manageable standard for adjudication. The “central problem,” as Justice Scalia put it in Vieth v. Jubelirer, is
how to set a standard that properly measures “when political gerrymandering has gone too far” given that “[t]he Constitution clearly contemplates
districting by political entities, and unsurprisingly that turns out to be rootand-branch a matter of politics.”2 The core premise that partisanship “is a
traditional criterion [in the law of politics], and a constitutional one”3 leads
necessarily to the analytical challenge of sorting out permissible partisanship
from “how much is too much.”4 But the premise that partisanship is an
“ordinary and lawful motive,”5 articulated confidently as settled law by Justice Scalia and widely understood as such, is also largely wrong as a matter
of constitutional doctrine.
What goes forgotten is how little support there is elsewhere in constitutional law, beyond Vieth, for Justice Scalia’s proposition that the government
can engage in purposeful partisan discrimination at all. Earlier case law on
redistricting acquiesced to the consideration of political criteria in the redistricting process, but there was at best only implicit suggestion of the constitutional permissibility of overt partisan discrimination by the government.
The Court itself agreed that government consideration of redistricting’s political consequences was inevitable and constitutional.6 The government, for
example, may consider respect for traditional political boundaries and subdivisions, district compactness and contiguity, and preserving communities
of interest, among other things. The government must consider other legal
imperatives in redistricting, including the one person, one vote doctrine and
1.
2001).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

See The Supreme Court in Conference (1940–1985), at 866 (Del Dickson ed.,
541 U.S. 267, 285, 296 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 952 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 298 (quoting id. at 344 (Souter, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 286.
See infra Section I.B.
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the Voting Rights Act, which often have partisan consequences baked into
them. However, courts acknowledging the need for and inevitability of the
government referring to political considerations rarely, if ever, went so far as
to endorse the active discrimination by the state for and against political
parties in redistricting—at least until Vieth.
Of course, this refusal makes perfect sense. The notion that the majority
party in government can actively discriminate against the interests of the
opposition violates a basic sensibility about democratic competition and
fairness. By partisanship here, I mean the “tribal partisanship,” as Justin
Levitt defines it, so endemic to redistricting.7 Tribal partisanship is primarily
about benefitting one’s own team of common partisan affiliation, or injuring the one’s partisan opponents, apart from other, legitimate considerations.8 The partisan use of government power in this sense, to disadvantage
competing parties in the process of democratic contestation, is the definition
of a process failure begging judicial intervention. For exactly this reason,
courts have enforced a basic norm of government neutrality when it comes
to political partisanship in constitutional law.9 First Amendment case law
about government speech and patronage most clearly announces the principle against government partisanship, but the norm permeates constitutional
law under many different rubrics, including equal protection case law addressing other elements of redistricting and election administration.10 Without unified judicial recognition of the principle as such, the implicit norm
draws from a common structural instinct against government political discrimination and partisan animus in its most flagrant forms.
It is ironic that one area of constitutional law where the Court has expressly sanctioned partisanship, at least where it does not go too far, is the
regulation of partisan gerrymandering. Constitutional challenges to partisan
gerrymanders have confronted two basic premises set up by Vieth and its
logic: First, Vieth appeared to decide that partisanship in districting is a constitutional state interest “so long as it does not go too far.”11 And second,
Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion in Vieth required an objective standard for demarcating where partisanship in districting has gone too far.12
The legal and political science scholarship on partisan gerrymandering has
largely, but incorrectly, accepted the first as a predicate to the second challenge of an objective standard for excessive partisan effects. An objective
standard for excessive partisan effects has been conceptually unmanageable
because it necessitates identification of the “fair” entitlement to representation as a normative baseline from which to measure the representational
7. Justin Levitt, The Partisanship Spectrum, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1787, 1798 (2014).
8. Id.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See discussion infra Sections II.A, II.B.
11. Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 952 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307–08 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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injury in partisan gerrymandering. And so, Vieth has stalled effective judicial
oversight of partisan gerrymandering for more than a decade and counting.
The broader constitutional context I describe here identifies Vieth as the
puzzling aberration from the general norm against government nonpartisanship. It therefore undercuts the first premise from Vieth that partisanship
is a constitutional state interest at all. If partisanship is not a constitutional
state interest for state lawmaking, then there is no need for the intractable
inquiry into an objective standard for determining when partisan effect goes
too far. Partisanship simply does not count, as I will explain, as a legitimate
government interest to justify official government decisionmaking—whether
the effect is large or small. For this reason, courts should focus not on
whether partisan effects of partisan gerrymandering are excessive and go too
far, but instead on the centrality of partisan purpose to the specific government decisionmaking in question.13 Virtually every plausible approach or
standard for judging the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering already incorporates and requires proof of government partisan purpose or
intent.14 Judicial inquiry into partisan purpose or intent is itself nothing new
in redistricting. If the government cannot offer a legitimate state purpose
beyond partisanship, then the redistricting should be unconstitutional under
equal protection, even under rational basis, irrespective of how extreme the
gerrymander’s partisan effects.
I describe how this focus on legitimate state interests and partisan purpose in gerrymandering is more faithful to the overarching norm against
government partisanship across constitutional law and is grounded in Justice
Stevens’s approach to gerrymandering back in Vieth. Although the law of
partisan gerrymandering has been obsessed with measurement of partisan
effects since Vieth, this proposed focus on government purpose offers a
more coherent approach that would unify and reify the healthy principle
against state partisanship.
13. Richard Fallon distinguishes legislative purpose and intent from legislative motive
and motivation. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 Harv.
L. Rev. 525, 535–45 (2016). Purpose or intent speak to the proximate aims sought by legislation, while motive and motivation denote the internal values, beliefs, and dispositions that
make desirable those aims. See id. Legislative purpose or intent can be identified as a matter of
law by the fact that a majority of legislators acted with a specific intent, or may be discerned by
objective deduction when there is no psychologically plausible explanation for their decisions
to enact other than the specific intent. See id. at 541–45.
14. See, e.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 315 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (requiring
purpose to impose burdens on a disfavored party); id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (proposing unconstitutionality when “a naked desire to increase partisan strength” is the only possible
explanation for a gerrymander); id. at 350–51 (Souter, J., dissenting) (requiring proof that the
government acted intentionally to dilute the vote); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127
(1986) (requiring “intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group”); Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 884 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (requiring discriminatory intent or
purpose), prob. juris. postponed to hearing on the merits, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017); Justin Levitt,
Intent Is Enough: Invidious Partisanship in Redistricting, 59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (forthcoming
Apr. 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3011062 [https://perma.cc/
XZD9-BFE4] (arguing that a finding of impermissible invidious partisan intent should be
sufficient for unconstitutionality).
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Never before in the modern era has judicial oversight of partisan gerrymandering been more needed. Courts have actively engaged the law of democracy since the 1960s and Baker v. Carr.15 This dive into the political
thicket, ironically, occurred at a historically aberrational moment of unusual
bipartisanship. The major parties enjoyed a rare period of cross-party cooperation and ideological overlap in the glow of post-war prosperity, galvanized by the solidarity necessitated by Cold War imperatives. Political
divisions were largely regional and focused less on party than race, pitting
the conservative one-party South largely against progressive wings of both
parties. As a partial result, the nascent election law developed by the Court
over the ensuing decades focused on racial discrimination in voting and
elections to the neglect of a larger partisan realignment between Republicans
and Democrats that defines modern-day politics and government. Today’s
inherited election law thus deals with overweening partisanship only in scattershot fashion, almost as distractions from the original problems of racial
discrimination.16
Discouraged by Vieth, courts addressing the hyperpolarized party politics of today, with its aggressive tribal partisanship, lack a clearly declared
constitutional principle from which to draw doctrinal support. As Sam Issacharoff has described it, “[C]ourts are left in the bizarre world of trying to
define the consequences of too much partisanship without an ability to condemn partisanship as such.”17 Commentators have been puzzled by recent
voting rights decisions to strike down or otherwise restrain government discretion where, under traditional equal protection methodology, only the
permissive standard of rational basis review should apply.18 Courts have
been typically deferential to regulation with predictable partisan consequences, provided regulation can be plausibly justified on other grounds,
however pretextual.19 But when partisan motivations of the government are
undeniably plain, they have compelled courts to curb arbitrary action even
under rational basis in the absence of another state interest.20 These cases
make sense if understood in relation to a broader, albeit undeclared constitutional norm against government partisanship. In recent cases over new
15. See infra Section I.B.
16. See infra Section III.B.
17. Samuel Issacharoff, Voter Welfare: An Emerging Rule of Reason in Voting Rights Law,
92 Ind. L.J. 299, 322 (2016).
18. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1865, 1898 (2013) (explaining that such decisions
“may well be justified as an expansion of precedent, but [they] cannot be defended as a natural
extension of that precedent”); Issacharoff, supra note 17, at 311 (noting that claims in one
prominent case “did not translate into a denial of a fundamental right, nor . . . readily equate
to a burden on the franchise” and similarly “did not trigger easy equal protection lines of
division along familiar categories such as race or national origin”).
19. See infra notes 283–309 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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voter identification requirements and early voting cutbacks, courts confronted government restrictions on voting rights that could not be sensibly
understood as anything except raw partisanship and were forced to invent
creative bases for minimizing their harms.21
Today’s hyperpolarized partisanship presents ever-increasing stress on
this doctrinal vulnerability, especially in redistricting.22 Unprecedented coordination and investment by the Republican Party in the 2011 redistricting
cycle23 contributed mightily to Republican takeover of both houses of Congress, the twenty-four states currently under unified Republican government, and Republican control of sixty-nine of ninety-nine state legislative
chambers, an all-time high.24 Democrats are now poised to respond in kind
for the 2021 redistricting cycle with their own organized national effort.25
Lower courts already took the lead in recognizing a partisan gerrymandering
challenge in Wisconsin,26 with cases proceeding elsewhere in Maryland,27
North Carolina,28 and Pennsylvania.29 The Court now will revisit partisan
gerrymandering in Gill v. Whitford, the Wisconsin case, ahead of the 2021
redistricting cycle.30 It should acknowledge, and build upon, the constitutional norm against government partisanship in reorienting the law toward a
purpose-focused approach.
First, courts need not obsessively weigh partisan effects when the government’s exclusive partisan purpose, distinct from its legitimate state interests, is clear.31 Although focus is on partisan purpose beyond mere subjective
21. See infra Section I.C.
22. See generally Nolan McCarty, Reducing Polarization: Some Facts for Reformers, 2015
U. Chi. Legal F. 243 (describing modern hyperpolarization and exploring its causes); Richard
H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America,
99 Calif. L. Rev. 273 (2011) (same).
23. See generally David Daley, Ratf**ked: The True Story Behind the Secret Plan
to Steal America’s Democracy (2016).
24. See Amber Phillips, These 3 Maps Show Just How Dominant Republicans Are in
America After Tuesday, Wash. Post (Nov. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-fix/wp/2016/11/12/these-3-maps-show-just-how-dominant-republicans-are-in-america-after-tuesday/?utm_term=.152326bf0091 [https://perma.cc/H8KU-YMBE].
25. See Edward-Isaac Dovere, Dem Redistricting Group Clocks $10.8 Million in First 6
Months, Politico (July 31, 2017, 5:35 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/31/democratic-redistricting-fundraising-obama-241154 [https://perma.cc/TP9P-DHXP].
26. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016), prob. juris. postponed to
hearing on the merits, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017).
27. Benisek v. Lamone, No. 13-cv-03233-JKB, 2017 WL 3642928 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2017),
appeal docketed, No. 17-333 (U.S. Sept. 1, 2017).
28. Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass’n v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Elections, 166 F. Supp. 3d 553 (E.D.
N.C.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 827 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2016).
29. League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, No. 261-MD-2017 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
filed June 15, 2017).
30. 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (mem.) (setting the case for hearing and postponing consideration of jurisdiction).
31. Partisan purpose could be imputed from direct evidence that the government acted
with partisan purpose or objective conclusion that no other account of legitimate legislative
purpose can explain the redistricting. See Fallon, supra note 13, at 541–47; see also Caleb
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motivation,32 an irony of the post-Vieth world is that governments have been
emboldened and sometimes confess openly to partisan purpose in redistricting, confident that plaintiffs will struggle to demonstrate excessive partisan
effects under Vieth.33 When the government admits or demonstrably relies
on partisan purpose as its basis for lawmaking, these egregious cases should
be actionable even without a showing of excessive partisan effects. Government admissions and evidence regarding the majority’s partisan purpose,
vis-à-vis legitimate government interests in redistricting, should be decisive
irrespective of partisan effects beyond some threshold showing. As a consequence, governments in charge of redistricting would be forced to clean up
their partisanship and moor their decisions more rigorously to public-regarding justifications and interests. This firmer requirement of state justification would substantively limit the achievable partisan advantage that
could be plausibly justified as serving legitimate government interests, as
well as tangibly re-orienting the redistricting process against today’s blatant
and overt partisanship.
New focus on partisan purpose would help resolve an important absurdity in the latest generation of racial gerrymandering claims. The state in
Harris v. McCrory argued it discriminated against African Americans not on
racial grounds, but against them as Democrats, because race correlates so
tightly with party identification in the South.34 The possibility of this “party,
not race” defense exemplifies the absurdity of Vieth’s faith that partisanship
is a constitutionally legitimate state interest “so long as it does not go too
far.”35 This self-contradictory faith creates the paradoxical defense that the
state could racially discriminate if it can justify the discrimination on the
basis of partisanship.36 But government purpose to discriminate on the basis
of either party or race ought to be unconstitutional, provided government
Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1784 (2008) (surveying judicial approaches for determining legislative purpose); Levitt, supra note 14 (manuscript at
46–50) (outlining existing judicial methods for determining legislative purpose in redistricting
cases). This approach can be reconciled with the broad framework of Vieth and more recently
in Whitford v. Gill in the sense that it likewise requires partisan intent and effect for unconstitutionality. The important difference, of course, is that the current law emphasizes egregiousness of partisan effect. The approach advocated here requires some threshold partisan effect,
but instead places greater weight on the role of partisan purpose in the government’s
decisionmaking.
32. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990) (distinguishing
between “legislative purpose” and the “motives of the legislators who enacted the law” (emphasis omitted)).
33. See, e.g., Patrick Gannon, Has Partisan Gerrymandering Finally Gone Too Far?, Salisbury Post (June 24, 2016, 1:08 PM), http://www.salisburypost.com/2016/06/24/patrick-gan
non-has-gerrymandering-finally-gone-too-far/ [https://perma.cc/2ATX-PY8C] (quoting the
North Carolina redistricting chair publicly stating, “I acknowledge freely that this will be a
political gerrymander, which is not against the law”).
34. 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 618–19 (M.D.N.C. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. Harris, 137
S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
35. Larios v. Cox, 542 U.S. 947, 952 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
36. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
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decisionmaking cannot otherwise be justified with reference to legitimate
state interests. Only the bizarre notion that partisanship is a legitimate state
interest, if it does not go too far, even opened the door to any version of this
perverse defense in racial gerrymandering cases.
Second, extreme partisan effects still may be relevant to a partisan gerrymandering claim, but mainly as indirect proof of essential partisan purpose.
At some extreme, egregious partisan bias in electoral consequences of a redistricting cannot be explained by legitimate government criteria but instead
can be explained only as a consequence of purpose to secure partisan advantage. Courts should assess whether a gerrymander’s extreme partisan effects
can be explained with reference to legitimate government criteria and other
objective considerations like geography or residential dispersion. Political
and computer scientists have developed sophisticated models for helping
with this type of determination, and when partisan bias reaches sufficiently
high levels, it becomes impossible to resist the conclusion of government
purpose to produce significant and durable partisan advantages for the majority.37 Note, though, that this approach offers no constitutional guarantee
of a “fair” apportionment,38 only a right against naked government partisanship in the redistricting process. The simple fact that a redistricting produces
significant partisan bias is insufficient for a constitutional claim if it can be
explained plausibly with reference to legitimate government interests. Purpose is the principal focus, with effects an indirect means for its inference.
Indeed, perhaps the most charitable way to understand even the insistence
in Vieth on excessive partisan effects is as a prudential limitation to cases
where partisan purpose is undeniably the basis for redistricting.
In Part I, I introduce the law of gerrymandering, beginning with Davis
v. Bandemer and leading to Vieth v. Jubelirer. I argue that Justice Scalia’s
salesmanship in his lead opinion in Vieth successfully diverted the law of
gerrymandering toward a misguided obsession with partisan effects. Justice
Scalia distracted the Court from a purpose-based approach offered by Justices Stevens and Breyer that is far more nuanced and focused than Justice
Scalia acknowledged, but has been largely misunderstood and forgotten. Although political considerations are intrinsic to redistricting, and partisanship obviously pervades the redistricting process, unadorned government
discrimination on the basis of partisanship violates constitutional law.
In Part II, I survey constitutional law to demonstrate the vitality of this
implicit norm against government partisanship across a variety of settings.
From political patronage, to government speech, to election administration,
37. See, e.g., Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political
Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. Pol. Sci. 239 (2013); Wendy K. Tam Cho &
Yan Y. Liu, Toward a Talismanic Redistricting Tool: A Computational Method for Identifying
Extreme Redistricting Plans, 15 Election L.J. 351 (2016).
38. See, e.g., Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 869 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (rejecting a
claim that “any apportionment scheme that purposely prevents proportional representation is
unconstitutional” (emphasis added by court) (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109,
129–30 (1986) (plurality opinion))), prob. juris. postponed to hearing on the merits, 137 S. Ct.
2268 (2017).
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and even in redistricting, Vieth is the exception in failing to bar tribal partisanship as a legitimate state interest in lawmaking. Courts, with varying degrees of explicitness, have struck down clear government partisanship that
cannot be defended otherwise in terms of legitimate state interests. In
Part III, I propose a better approach to partisan gerrymandering based on
the norm against government partisanship. Modeled after the Court’s one
person, one vote doctrine, the approach would require that a plaintiff show
that partisan purpose rather than legitimate state interests accounts for the
gerrymander’s partisan characteristics, independent of their extremeness. I
address potential criticisms from opposite directions that this approach goes
too far and that it does not go far enough. Finally, I outline the urgency of
surfacing the nascent antipartisanship principle that has been emerging in
election law cases over the last decade as a needed judicial response to modern hyperpolarization. The 2021 redistricting cycle is just around the corner,
hanging in the balance.
I. Law of Partisan Gerrymandering and Vieth v. Jubelirer
The Court’s recent redistricting decisions assume the constitutionality
of partisan gerrymandering provided it does not go too far. The law of partisan gerrymandering has since been obsessed with the quest for a judicially
manageable standard for measuring excessive partisanship, without any successful resolution so far. However, jurisprudential support for the constitutionality of government partisanship in redistricting is surprisingly thin,
certainly far less convincing than usually supposed since Vieth. The Court
has clearly and consistently held that political considerations are legitimate
government interests in redistricting but rarely if ever, until Vieth, expressed
constitutional approval for purely partisan motivations.
A. Vieth and the Quest for a Manageable Standard
The Court first attempted to put constitutional limits on partisan gerrymandering in Davis v. Bandemer.39 In federal district court, Indiana Democrats won their equal protection challenge to the 1981 decennial state
redistricting of their state house and senate districts under Republican control.40 Under that Republican gerrymander, Democratic candidates for the
Indiana House received 52 percent of the votes in the 1982 elections across
the state but won only forty-three of 100 House seats.41 Reviewing the constitutional challenge, the district court found that the Republicans drew districts without consideration for existing political subdivision boundaries,
often splitting counties and townships sometimes with “simply no conceivable justification.”42 The court concluded there was “no refuting that the Republican majority focused on protecting its incumbents and creating every
39.
40.
41.
42.

478 U.S. 109 (1986).
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 109.
Id.
Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1487 (S.D. Ind. 1984), rev’d, 478 U.S. 109.
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possible ‘safe’ Republican district possible.”43 In particular, skillful use of
multimember districts led to Democrats winning only three of twenty-one
House seats in the Indianapolis metropolitan area, despite winning 46 percent of the vote there.44
The Supreme Court reversed the district court on the judgment, but in
the process, the Court also declared political gerrymandering to be constitutionally justiciable under the equal protection clause.45 Justice White’s opinion for the Court reasoned that earlier decisions subjecting legislative
districting to equal protection challenges on one person, one vote and racial
vote dilution grounds spoke to the common question of adequacy of representation in state legislatures.46 The fact that a political gerrymandering
claim is “submitted by a political group, rather than a racial group, does not
distinguish it in terms of justiciability,” though it obviously differentiates
how claims are adjudicated.47 Writing for a plurality, Justice White required
that, to win a political gerrymandering claim, plaintiffs needed to prove intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual
discriminatory effect on that group.48 To establish discriminatory effect,
plaintiffs needed to show more than a mere lack of proportional representation. They needed to prove “the electoral system is arranged in a manner
that will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the
political process as a whole.”49
The Bandemer standard, though, proved exceptionally difficult to satisfy. Over eighteen years of cases decided under Bandemer, only one time
did a trial court find an equal protection violation under the Bandemer standard.50 Even the single successful claim proved the rule, not the exception. A
district court found that North Carolina’s system of judicial elections for
state superior court unconstitutionally discriminated against Republicans
under the Bandemer standard.51 Just five days after the decision, however,
43. Id. at 1488. Republican leaders, as the district court noted, made no apology for their
partisan motivations. Id. Republicans in the General Assembly voted out empty reapportionment bills to a conference committee composed entirely of Republicans who worked on the
substance in secret, without Democratic input or public hearings until two days before a
party-line floor vote. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 175–76 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). One Republican House leader acknowledged “[t]he name of the game is to
keep us in power.” Id. at 177–78.
44. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 182. Earlier iterations of these districts had been challenged
unsuccessfully as racially dilutive under equal protection in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124
(1971).
45. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 113 (plurality opinion).
46. See id. at 118–21 (majority opinion).
47. Id. at 125.
48. Id. at 127 (plurality opinion).
49. Id. at 132.
50. See Republican Party of N.C. v. Hunt, No. 94-2410, 1996 WL 60439 (4th Cir. Feb. 12,
1996) (describing the lower court’s order, issued on November 3, 1994, which invalidated
North Carolina’s judicial election scheme).
51. Id.

December 2017]

The Constitutional Norm Against Government Partisanship

361

Republican candidates for superior court swept the next set of elections so
convincingly that the Fourth Circuit promptly reversed.52
Whether the near total absence of success under Bandemer was the
Court’s intention seems unanswerable even to the justices themselves at this
point. Dan Lowenstein argued that Bandemer purposely (and correctly) set
an extremely high bar for partisan gerrymandering claims.53 In Lowenstein’s
telling, it is possible to read Bandemer as articulating a standard for partisan
gerrymandering that could be met only if it was “so powerful.”54 The predictable outcome under the standard was that a partisan gerrymander, at
least of the common variety, could never satisfy the Bandemer standard
short of the historically extreme malapportionment preceding the one person, one vote rule.55 Under Lowenstein’s account, it was no surprise that
there was virtually no success under Bandemer because the result was intentional and judicially appropriate.56
The Court’s decision to schedule Vieth v. Jubelirer for oral argument in
2003 seemed to presage clarification about partisan gerrymandering, one
way or the other. The Court appeared poised either to declare partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable after all, or in the alternative, articulate a more
workable and attainable standard. Astoundingly, the Court’s 4–1–4 split in
Vieth somehow made exceptionally murky law even murkier and less certain. Over a splintered set of opinions, the justices expressed seemingly every
possible position on the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering but
coalesced a cohesive majority for none of them. Neither skeptics nor advocates of judicial supervision over partisan gerrymandering were pleased or
any surer of the applicable law.
Refusing to overrule Bandemer and declare partisan gerrymandering
nonjusticiable, a majority of five justices voted in favor of continuing the
“possibility of judicial relief” for partisan gerrymandering in redistricting
cases.57 Four of these five justices endorsed specific standards for judging the
constitutionality of partisan gerrymanders and would have reversed the
lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ challenge to the Republican gerrymander of Pennsylvania’s congressional districts litigated in Vieth.58 Justice
Kennedy, however, held the pivotal vote on both questions of threshold justiciability and the constitutional standard under which claims should be
52. Id.
53. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Bandemer’s Gap: Gerrymandering and Equal Protection,
in Political Gerrymandering and the Courts 64, 82–86 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990).
54. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Vieth’s Gap: Has the Supreme Court Gone from Bad to
Worse on Partisan Gerrymandering?, 14 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 367, 378 (2005).
55. See id.
56. Id. at 379.
57. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
58. Id. at 318–19 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 347–51, 355 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at
365–68 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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judged. Justice Kennedy agreed with the aforementioned four justices on the
first question to uphold the justiciability of the gerrymandering claim.59
But on the second question of the constitutional standard, Justice Kennedy refused to affirm the old Bandemer standard and also refused to articulate a new one or join the other four justices with respect to any of their
proposed new standards.60 In rejecting these potential standards, Justice
Kennedy explained that “[b]ecause there are yet no agreed upon substantive
principles of fairness in districting, we have no basis on which to define
clear, manageable, and politically neutral standards” for identifying unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.61 The absence of an objective baseline
made it difficult to measure the harm and define an impermissible threshold
of constitutional injury. In other words, Justice Kennedy insisted upon an
affirmative vision for legitimate districting practices and fair partisan outcomes before developing a negative standard for unlawful partisan gerrymandering that goes too far. Unless one can initially identify the “fair”
baseline entitlement of political representation, it is impossible to judge precisely when a gerrymander inflicts excessive harm by granting less representation than the rightful allocation.
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy still voted in favor of justiciability because
he left open the possibility of future development of just such a vision. He
insisted that “new technologies may produce new methods of analysis that
make more evident the precise nature of the burdens gerrymanders impose
on the representational rights of voters and parties” and therefore facilitate
judicial identification of a suitable standard in the future.62 As a result, Justice Kennedy explained that lower courts should continue to litigate partisan
gerrymandering claims, but he declined to articulate a specific constitutional
standard under which such claims should be litigated—a position that Justice Scalia ridiculed as “not legally available.”63 Unfortunately, Justice Kennedy’s peculiar opinion actually spoke for the Court in Vieth as the
narrowest ruling in favor of the Court’s judgment affirming the lower
court.64 One scholar has described this outcome as producing “a limbo
where a standard for identifying unlawful gerrymanders might exist but has
yet to be discovered.”65
Justice Scalia wrote in Vieth for four justices against the justiciability of
partisan gerrymandering under any standard. Justice Scalia admitted that
59. Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
60. Id. at 306–17.
61. Id. at 307–08.
62. Id. at 313.
63. Id. at 301 (plurality opinion).
64. Cf. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (ruling that absent a majority
opinion, the holding of the case is defined by the “position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)))
65. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 160 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1379, 1382 (2012) (emphasis omitted).
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they did not dispute “the incompatibility of severe partisan gerrymanders
with democratic principles” and agreed that “an excessive injection of politics is unlawful” in legislative districting.66 But Justice Scalia premised their
opposition to justiciability on the political question doctrine.67 Under the
doctrine, he explained that there was no judicially manageable standard for
the “original unanswerable question” of when “political gerrymandering has
gone too far.”68 For Justice Scalia, the “record of puzzlement and consternation” under the Bandemer standard proved the unmanageability of any standard for gerrymandering.69 Agreeing with Justice Kennedy, he argued that
there were no objective criteria to guide and constrain lower courts judging
for excessive partisanship in redistricting, at least beyond a general sense of
partisan fairness.70 Furthermore, the regular influence of partisanship in districting meant that court challenges based on partisanship would always be
sufficiently credible to drag courts into greater oversight of this political
process.71
Critically complicating the analysis for Justice Scalia was that he insisted
some level of partisanship in districting was constitutionally permissible. He
underscored the point by beginning with a long exposition of gerrymandering’s historical pedigree dating back to the colonial period.72 This pedigree
bolstered his contention in Vieth that partisanship is “an ordinary and lawful motive” in districting and that “partisan districting is a lawful and common practice.”73 Justice Scalia argued that “setting out to segregate [voters]
by political affiliation is (so long as one doesn’t go too far) lawful and hence
ordinary.”74 Vieth therefore presented a difficult and nuanced question of
“drawing the line between good politics and bad politics.”75 To regulate partisan gerrymandering, the Court needed a standard that tolerated some regular minimum of partisanship in districting, but still required lower courts
to measure the quantum of partisanship in a particular case against an objectively defined threshold of impermissibility. And in Justice Scalia’s view, it
was impossible to craft a workable standard for guiding lower courts on
“[h]ow much political motivation and effect is too much” to meet these
requirements.76
This problem of separating permissible from impermissible partisanship, in this framing, was the key to the unmanageability of any partisan
66. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 292–93 (plurality opinion).
67. Id. at 277.
68. Id. at 296–97.
69. Id. at 282.
70. Id. at 291.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 274–75.
73. Id. at 286.
74. Id. at 293.
75. Id. at 299.
76. Id. at 297.
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gerrymandering standard. Justice Scalia, for instance, distinguished standards from other areas of law regulating government partisanship along
these lines.77 The Shaw v. Reno cases prohibit the predominant use of race in
districting and offer a model for regulating partisanship that the Vieth plaintiffs tried to build upon and that Justice Stevens endorsed in dissent.78 Justice
Scalia argued, however, that regulating race was different than regulating
partisanship because “segregating voters on the basis of race is not a lawful
one,” whereas doing so based on partisanship was “a lawful and common
practice.”79 The standard for race in the Shaw cases was manageable, while
any standard for partisanship was not, because inspecting a districting
scheme for “a rare and constitutionally suspect motive as to invalidate it is
quite different from determining whether it is so substantially affected by
the excess of an ordinary and lawful motive.”80 Justice Scalia saw a significant difference between identifying any of something and identifying too
much of it, at least in this context.81 Like Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia believed the latter required an affirmative sense of what lawful partisanship
looked like, while the former did not.
Justice Scalia’s framing of the problem in Vieth quickly defined the law
of partisan gerrymandering. Even dissenting in Vieth, Justice Souter agreed
that “some intent to gain political advantage is inescapable whenever political bodies devise a district plan” such that “the issue is one of how much is
too much.”82 He aimed the proposed standard in his dissent at “identify[ing]
clues, as objective as we can make them, indicating that partisan competition
has reached an extremity of unfairness.”83 When the Supreme Court returned to the problem in its next major gerrymandering case, LULAC v.
Perry,84 Justice Kennedy again recited the same dilemma over the proper
standard. Evaluating a gerrymander of Texas’s congressional districts, he explained once again the need for a “workable test for judging partisan
gerrymanders.”85
A group of LULAC amici proposed the use of partisan-symmetry scores,
invented by political scientists Gary King, Bernie Grofman, and Andrew
Gelman, among others, that measure bias in the number of votes each party
needed to win additional seats.86 Partisan-symmetry scores purport to compute the differential advantage the majority party enjoys from the gerrymander by calculating when one party needs many more votes than the other to
77. Id. at 285–90.
78. 509 U.S. 630 (1993); see also Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317–41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286 (plurality opinion).
80. Id.
81. Cf. Richmond Campbell, The Sorites Paradox, 26 Phil. Stud. 175 (1974).
82. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 344 (Souter, J., dissenting).
83. Id.
84. 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
85. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 420 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
86. Id. at 419–20 (discussing the amicus brief).
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win additional seats—the hallmark of an effective gerrymander.87 But Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion dismissed the proposed measures as “not a reliable measure of unconstitutional partisanship”88 and rejected another partisan gerrymandering claim for lack of a sufficiently convincing objective
standard for partisan effects.89 Why? It was still unclear to Justice Kennedy
when, under any measure, a score for differential advantage crossed over
from lawful partisanship to excessive partisanship.90 This question was unavoidably normative. The measure of asymmetry quantified the majority advantage but could not by itself pinpoint an obvious normative threshold to
be drawn between Scalia’s lawful practice and a greater, unlawful degree of
bias that should be unconstitutional. There, political science of the time
seemed to offer the Court little help.
The case law and scholarship since Vieth has been likewise obsessed with
the quest for a judicially manageable standard for judging “how much is too
much” in partisan gerrymandering.91 The Court has not heard another partisan gerrymandering case since LULAC, but lower courts have skeptically
reviewed these claims, with the Court’s insistence on a convincing standard
at the forefront.92 Virtually all the intervening scholarship on partisan gerrymandering focused on the feasibility of a judicial standard and its possible
contours. Some commentators concluded that no judicially manageable
standard as Justice Kennedy imagined it was feasible and largely surrendered
the possibility.93 Some commentators proposed specific approaches based on
specific measures. Ned Foley, for instance, endorsed a quantitative measure
of geographic compactness devised by Steve Ansolabehere and Maxwell
Palmer94 and then proposed that a gerrymander’s excessiveness be judged
against the benchmark score for the original eponymous gerrymander by
87. Id. For instance, King and Gelman compare how the parties fare hypothetically if
each received a given percentage of the vote, relying on a uniform swing assumption for their
estimates. See Andrew Gelman & Gary King, A Unified Method of Evaluating Electoral Systems
and Redistricting Plans, 38 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 514, 517–28 (1994).
88. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 420 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
89. Id. at 423.
90. Id. at 420.
91. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 298 (2004) (plurality opinion) (quoting id. at 344
(Souter, J., dissenting)).
92. See, e.g., Perez v. Perry, 26 F. Supp. 3d 612 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Ala. Legislative Black
Caucus v. Alabama, 988 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (M.D. Ala.), appeal dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 694 (2013);
Comm. for a Fair & Balanced Map v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 835 F. Supp. 2d 563 (N.D. Ill.
2011); Pearson v. Koster, 359 S.W.3d 35 (Mo. 2012) (per curiam); State ex rel. Cooper v.
Tennant, 730 S.E.2d 368 (W. Va. 2012).
93. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna B. Prakash, Tempest in an Empty Teapot: Why
the Constitution Does Not Regulate Gerrymandering, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1 (2008); Justin
Driver, Rules, the New Standards: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Manageability After
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1166 (2005).
94. Stephen Ansolabehere & Maxwell Palmer, A Two Hundred-Year Statistical History of
the Gerrymander, 77 Ohio St. L.J. 741 (2016).
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Elbridge Gerry from 1812.95 Nick Stephanopoulos and Eric McGhee offered
a new measure of partisan bias with their efficiency gap.96 Their score calculates each party’s wasted votes as a percentage of total votes cast as a metric
for comparative efficiency in converting votes to seats by each party. Any
efficiency gap between the majority and minority parties reflects the gerrymander’s partisan skew.97 Across these disparate approaches, two assumptions hold as lasting lessons from Vieth: First, scholars focused mainly on a
gerrymander’s partisan effect rather than partisan purpose.98 Second, they
echo Justice Scalia from Vieth in assuming some partisanship is lawful and
then identifying the core problem as determining “how much is too
much.”99
B. An Alternate View
Justice Scalia’s successful framing of partisan gerrymandering law as a
question of “how much is too much”100 has dominated the law and scholarship, but surprisingly, this framing is more a matter of judicial salesmanship
than foundation in constitutional law. Justice Scalia claimed soon after Vieth
that “all but one but one of the Justices agreed” in the case that partisanship
“is a traditional criterion, and a constitutional one, so long as it does not go
too far.”101 But even that claim is questionable at best, and I will argue, so
too is the larger assertion of partisanship as a legitimate government motivation in districting.
Of course, there was no question whether Justice Stevens contested the
legitimacy of partisan considerations in districting. Justice Stevens had long
railed against gerrymandering of all sorts, whether racial, partisan, or otherwise, as fundamental problems of equal protection that should be adjudicated under the same analytic framework he offered in cases from Mobile v.
Bolden to Bandemer v. Davis to Vieth v. Jubelirer.102 For Justice Stevens, “the
Equal Protection Clause implements a duty to govern impartially that requires, at the very least, that every decision by the sovereign serve some
nonpartisan public purpose.”103 As a consequence, Justice Stevens reasoned
that “political affiliation is not an appropriate standard for excluding voters
95. Edward B. Foley, Due Process, Fair Play, and Excessive Partisanship, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev.
655, 720–24 (2017).
96. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the
Efficiency Gap, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 831, 849–67 (2015).
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Ansolabehere & Palmer, supra note 94; Foley, supra note 95.
99. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 298 (2004) (plurality opinion) (quoting id. at 344
(Souter, J. dissenting)); see, e.g., Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 96, at 834–38.
100. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 298 (quoting id. at 344 (Souter, J. dissenting)).
101. Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 952 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
102. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Cousins’ Kin: Justice Stevens and Voting Rights, 27
Rutgers L.J. 521 (1996).
103. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 333 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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from a congressional district.”104 Districting choices explained only by bare
partisanship, unaccompanied by any other government rationale, would be
unconstitutional even under rational basis because “an acceptable rational
basis can be neither purely personal nor purely partisan.”105
Justice Stevens therefore challenged head-on Justice Scalia’s essential
claim that constitutional law acquiesced to government partisanship “so
long as one doesn’t go too far.”106 In Vieth, Justice Stevens censured Justice
Scalia for “assuming that politics is ‘an ordinary and lawful motive.’ ”107 Instead, Justice Stevens countered that, until Vieth, “there ha[d] not been the
slightest intimation in any opinion written by any Member of this Court
that a naked purpose to disadvantage a political minority would provide a
rational basis for drawing a district line.”108 Furthermore, First Amendment
law outlawing government patronage based on bare partisanship made clear
a constitutional prohibition against state action “for the sole and unadorned
purpose of maximizing the power of the majority.”109 In those cases, it was
unconstitutional for partisan officeholders to reward fellow party members
and punish nonmembers through government patronage, despite long historical practice.110
What explains this stark disagreement about the constitutional permissibility of government partisanship between Justices Scalia and Stevens?
Where Justice Stevens saw no constitutional sanction for partisanship as a
state motivation in districting, Justice Scalia saw partisanship as an ordinary
and lawful motive. They disagreed not only normatively about what constitutional law ought to have been on the question, but also empirically about
what the Court had already decided by what each justice believed were unambiguous terms.
First, the justices drew radically different conclusions from the fact that
the Court’s previous decisions consistently recognized redistricting as an inherently political process, driven by fundamentally political interests and
consequences. The Court had always acknowledged, as Justice Scalia observed, that the “Constitution clearly contemplates districting by political
entities, and unsurprisingly that turns out to be root-and-branch a matter of
politics.”111 In this sense, the Court’s previous decisions rejected any idealistic fancy that legislative redistricting could be preserved as neutral, apolitical,
or otherwise segregated from the complex political considerations that usually dominate the process. The Court permitted the government, among
104. Id. at 325.
105. Id. at 338.
106. Id. at 293 (plurality opinion).
107. Id. at 324 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 336–37.
109. Id. at 326.
110. See id. at 324 (discussing the Court’s decision to apply strict scrutiny to First Amendment cases in which there is “a purpose to discriminate on the basis of politics”).
111. Id. at 285 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
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other things, to respect traditional political boundaries, preserve communities of political interest, reflect the parties’ respective voting strengths, avoid
pairing incumbent officeholders, and comply with various state and federal
mandates including the Voting Rights Act and one person, one vote.112 Toward that end, the Court accepted as commonplace the government’s consultation of political data and consideration of districting’s electoral
consequences in the redistricting process. Overarching this framework, as
Justice Scalia emphasized, the Court had knowingly observed that partisan
interests pervade any redistricting process executed by political actors.113
Justice Scalia conflated the Court’s past acceptance of government consideration of redistricting’s partisan consequences with a broader endorsement of government partisanship as a motivation for redistricting. The
Court had sanctioned political motivations for redistricting in line with the
various recognized state interests the government was entitled to pursue in
redistricting. Toward that end, even government consideration of political
data on party registration, past voting patterns, and other predictors of redistricting’s partisan implications were relevant in helping assess how well
the state could satisfy its goals in achieving representational fairness or carving out majority-minority districts for racial minorities for instance.114 That
is, the state was entitled to weigh partisan considerations and make districting choices with their partisan implications in mind in pursuit of legitimate
political objectives. This acceptance, though, is different from permitting the
state to redistrict with purely partisan motivations to advantage one major
party at the expense of the other. Political motivations were inherent in districting, as was consideration of partisan consequences, but as Justice Stevens tried to point out in Vieth,115 the bare purpose of partisan
discrimination without reference to any other legitimate state interest, political or otherwise, was not necessarily permissible by implication as Justice
Scalia assumed.
Consider, for example, Gaffney v. Cummings, which is frequently cited
as Court sanction for partisanship in redistricting. Along these lines, the
Court there explained that “[t]he reality is that districting inevitably has and

112. For purposes of the Article, I assume arguendo the legitimacy of these state interests
grounded in past decisions. However, I have previously criticized incumbency protection as a
normative matter, see Michael S. Kang, The Bright Side of Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 Cornell J.L. Pub. Pol’y 443 (2005), and agree that purposeful government insulation of incumbents in redistricting raises similar concerns about government discrimination I discuss here.
What is more, courts have most clearly recognized a narrow government interest in avoiding
contests between incumbents as opposed to a broader interest in protecting incumbents from
challenge in general. See Michael Parsons, Clearing the Political Thicket: Why Political Gerrymandering for Partisan Advantage Is Unconstitutional, 24 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1107,
1145–46 (2016).
113. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 285 (plurality opinion).
114. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) (“The reality is that districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political consequences.”).
115. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 318 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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is intended to have substantial political consequences.”116 In rejecting a constitutional challenge to Connecticut’s legislative redistricting, the Court reasoned that “[i]t would be idle, we think, to contend that any political
consideration taken into account in fashioning a reapportionment plan is
sufficient to invalidate it.”117 Justices Scalia and Kennedy cited these statements from Gaffney repeatedly in Vieth for the notion that the government
may constitutionally discriminate in redistricting based on political classifications.118 But the Court hardly endorsed partisan gerrymandering in Gaffney. Quite the opposite. The Court upheld a redistricting by a bipartisan
commission that attempted to allocate seats to the major parties in accordance with their voting strength during the previous three elections.119 It
concluded only that there was no constitutional ground to strike down a
redistricting plan “because it undertakes, not to minimize or eliminate the
political strength of any group or party, but to recognize it and, through
districting, provide a rough sort of proportional representation.”120 In acquiescing to the political essence of redistricting, the Court explained that consideration of party registration and voting records was constitutional against
any contrary claim in Gaffney that redistricting decisions must be made
“without regard for political impact.”121 In this sense, the Court in Gaffney
upheld the consideration of political and partisan consequences in redistricting, but did so absolutely without endorsing partisan gerrymandering to
deliberately minimize the political strength of an opposing party. All the
case facts actually pointed to the opposite conclusion.
Second, Justices Scalia and Stevens drew different lessons from the
Court’s previous acquiescence to partisan advantage resulting from the political process of redistricting. The Court’s previous decisions contemplated
that the state’s pursuit of legitimate political ends in districting would result
in partisan advantage and disadvantage so long as it was controlled by selfinterested political actors. Regardless of how insistently courts required redistricting to be tied to legitimate state interests, the Court acknowledged
that “[d]istrict lines are rarely neutral phenomena”122 and “implicate a political calculus in which various interests compete for recognition.”123 This acknowledgment reflected an understanding that self-interested politicians

116. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753.
117. Id. at 752.
118. See Veith, 541 U.S. at 285–86 (plurality opinion); id. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment).
119. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 754.
120. Id. But see Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 154–55 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (claiming equivalence between the bipartisan gerrymander in Gaffney
and partisan gerrymanders).
121. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753.
122. Id.
123. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 914 (1995).
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would always bend redistricting choices to their advantage, given the partisan stakes, and always find ostensible justification in some related state interest to defend those choices against legal challenge.124 As Justice Scalia argued,
“[T]here always is a neutral explanation—if only the time-honored criterion
of incumbent protection.”125 So, the Court related, and acquiesced to, a realistic awareness of the underlying political dynamics in redistricting beyond
the surface-level justifications required from the state.
Again, though, the Court’s realistic acceptance of partisan motivations
in districting as a practical matter did not necessarily compel or imply the
Court’s acceptance of partisan motivation as a legal justification for constitutional purposes. There is a meaningful difference between, on one hand,
understanding that government actors in charge of redistricting are tacitly
motivated by partisan self-interest that belies their pretextual justifications
and, on the other hand, outright endorsing partisanship as a legitimate government interest in redistricting. For this reason, Justices Stevens and Breyer
took pains to emphasize the role of nonpartisan justifications in their approaches to Vieth. Justice Breyer identified unjustified entrenchment as the
harm from partisan gerrymandering and defined it as “the result of partisan
manipulation and not other factors” such as “sheer happenstance,” other
constitutional requirements, or “reliance on traditional . . . districting criteria.”126 For Justice Stevens, the relevant question was whether a “neutral criterion can be identified to justify the lines drawn.”127 Both justices therefore
focused on whether redistricting decisions could be justified by nonpartisan
state interests, regardless of any partisan advantage baked into them, or
whether “partisanship is the legislature’s sole motivation.”128
Why accede to tacit partisanship in redistricting that can be ostensibly
justified with reference to other government interests? Why not simply
stamp out any subjective partisan motive when it leads to partisan advantage
if partisanship is the core harm? One answer is that any sort of prohibited
legislative intention is too hard to detect and too easy to conceal. Canny
legislators who intend a partisan gerrymander but know that their intention
is prohibited by law will mask their legislative intentions and articulate their
purposes only in public-spirited terms. This concealment already occurs for
most partisan skirmishes in the so-called voting wars, where lawmakers try
124. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 593,
643 (2002) (proposing a categorical prohibition against redistricting by self-interested insiders
in part as a response to this inevitability).
125. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 300 (2004) (plurality opinion) (emphasis omitted).
126. Id. at 360–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 318. Consider Richard Fallon’s distinction between permissibility of actions
and permissibility of motives. Fallon, supra note 13, at 565. He presents the hypothetical of a
legislature that passes a law requiring childhood vaccination because it dislikes Christian
Scientists, who oppose vaccination on religious grounds. Id. The legislature’s psychological
motivation is capricious, but a court still could uphold the law’s constitutionality if the law
independently serves a compelling interest, such as halting a disease epidemic. See id.
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to manipulate various electoral rules and procedures in and beyond districting for political advantage.129 Where lawmakers’ efforts will be thwarted legally if their intentions are made plain, lawmakers learn quickly not to make
too plain their intentions.
More importantly, Justices Stevens and Breyer appeared to regard partisanship in districting less as an unconstitutional government motivation
than an illegitimate one for purposes of rational basis. Neither justice insisted the presence of any partisan motivation constituted automatic
grounds for invalidation per se. However, there must be other reference to
legitimate state interests and democratic ends by the state in the redistricting
such that partisanship cannot be said to be the legislature’s sole motivation.
Otherwise, where “purely political ‘gerrymandering’ will fail to advance any
plausible democratic objective”130 and “where no justification other than
party advantage can be found,”131 the government’s districting decisions
could be successfully challenged under equal protection. In other words,
mere partisanship does not invalidate a redistricting by its presence, but it
could not serve as constitutional justification for it either.132 Justice Stevens
articulated the same principle by denying a “naked purpose to disadvantage
a political minority would provide a rational basis”133 and then focused the
constitutional question in Vieth on “whether the legislature allowed partisan
considerations to dominate and control the lines drawn, forsaking all neutral principles.”134
This reasoning by Justices Stevens and Breyer became even clearer in the
subsequent gerrymandering case, LULAC v. Perry. There, the Court rejected
a gerrymandering challenge to a mid-decade redistricting in Texas, where
129. For example, a 2011 presentation by Tom Hofeller, a Republican redistricting consultant, detailed the importance of secrecy in redistricting work and underscored that “[a]
journey to legal HELL starts with but a single misstatement OR a stupid email!” See Daley,
supra note 23, at 44.
130. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 355 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 367.
132. See Fallon, supra note 13, at 554–57 (distinguishing between forbidden intent as
grounds for automatic invalidation as opposed to simple invocation of further judicial
scrutiny).
133. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 336–37 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) (striking down the Defense of Marriage Act under equal protection
as unconstitutionally motivated by animus against same-sex couples); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 632–36 (1996) (ruling that bare animus to disadvantage a group, even outside a
fundamental right or protected class, does not qualify as a legitimate state interest under rational basis); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973) (concluding equal
protection “must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest” (emphasis omitted)).
134. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 339; cf. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (explaining a
statute is not necessarily unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause simply because it is
motivated by religious intent unless it is motivated entirely by intent to advance religion and
has no secular purpose at all); Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 Va. L. Rev. 87, 118
(2002) (explaining the secular purpose requirement as policing objective legislative outcomes
rather than subjective legislative inputs).
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the state chose to redraw district lines a second time after the state’s decennial obligation had already been met.135 This departure from usual practice,
without constitutional obligation, appeared to be entirely an effort to increase Republican partisan advantage, which the state did not deny by offering any alternate grounds for its decision.136 For the LULAC plurality on the
question, the state’s entirely partisan purpose for the mid-decade redistricting did not make it an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. According to
Justice Kennedy’s ongoing reasoning, there was still no sufficiently objective
standard by which to decide whether the partisan effect of the gerrymander
was excessive to the point of unconstitutionality.137
For Justices Stevens and Breyer, the facts of the case made clear the
redistricting’s “sole purpose of advantaging Republicans and disadvantaging
Democrats,” regardless of the actual magnitude of the resulting partisan advantage.138 The crux of the question was not the excessiveness of the partisan
gerrymander but whether state action was supported by any legitimate state
interest. The unique facts of LULAC laid bare that the re-redistricting was
motivated entirely by a desire to maximize partisan advantage such that the
state did not try hard to justify the plan on nonpartisan grounds.139 The
obvious conclusion that “desire for partisan gain was the sole factor motivating the decision to redistrict” meant that the state failed its “constitutional requirement that state action must be supported by a legitimate
interest.”140 Partisanship by itself didn’t count.
This coherent account of the law of partisan gerrymandering has largely
been forgotten from Vieth. Justice Scalia leveraged the consensus that partisan motivations in redistricting were unavoidable and not per se unconstitutional into a confident declaration that partisanship was a legitimate state
interest in redistricting. As a result, gerrymandering has been understood to
be unconstitutional only if taken to excess, a level that thus far has not been
objectively defined by some manageable standard. Note that in Vieth itself,
even Justice Kennedy appeared to strain away from adopting exactly this
view. He cautioned against “a standard that turns on whether the partisan
interests in the redistricting process were excessive.”141 He directed the inquiry instead to whether “political classifications were used to burden a
135. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 410–13 (2005)
(plurality opinion).
136. Id. at 423–25 (majority opinion); id. at 492 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. See id. at 420 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
138. Id. at 462 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
139. Id. at 491–92 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Texas Republicans conceded they had gerrymandered to favor Republicans over Democrats, but did so in
part to correct the pro-Democratic bias of the preexisting districting map implemented by a
federal district court. See Henderson v. Perry, 399 F. Supp. 2d 756, 768–69 (E.D. Tex. 2005),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. LULAC, 548 U.S. 399.
140. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 462–63 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 316 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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group’s representational rights,” airily suggesting patronage cases under the
First Amendment as possible guidance in this direction.142 Focused on intent, Justice Kennedy observed that “[i]f a State passed an enactment that
declared ‘All future apportionment shall be drawn so as most to burden
Party X’s rights to fair and effective representation . . .’ we would surely
conclude the Constitution had been violated.”143 But two years later, Justice
Kennedy shrugged off citations to his earlier attention to partisan purpose in
the LULAC case, where just such partisan motivations seemed to
predominate.
A shift in focus from Justice Scalia’s question of partisan excess to Justice Stevens’s question of legitimate state interest would have been momentous. Justice Stevens’s purpose focus would have obviated the need to
pinpoint a normative expectation of fair representation from which to measure excessive partisan effect. A purpose focus would identify partisan purpose as constitutionally illegitimate. Purpose might be identifiable from
direct evidence that the legislature redistricted for partisan advantage to the
exclusion of legitimate state interests, or otherwise undeniably demonstrable
from the sheer magnitude of partisan effect. Although courts might still
need to examine partisan effect in certain cases, they would not need to
judge the magnitude of partisan effect, beyond a minimum threshold, where
the courts could find partisan purpose by direct evidence, as in LULAC.
Where direct evidence is not convincing, then courts might look to the magnitude of effect, but the inquiry would be directed toward inferring purpose,
not establishing the magnitude of representational harm. In this sense, a
purpose focus sidesteps the necessary identification of a normative baseline
for fair representation entailed by an effects focus.
The sister decisions of Vieth and LULAC cemented the impression that
the burden rests with plaintiffs to establish the excessiveness of partisan effect rather than with the government to justify the gerrymander in nonpartisan terms. This burden of establishing extreme partisan effect proved
difficult to meet in the decade since those decisions. Substantively, a simple
bar on government partisanship as an official basis for lawmaking, regardless of its excessiveness, was already grounded in constitutional law.144 The
new requirement of excessiveness, coupled with official sanction for a lesser,
more moderate amount of government partisanship, was a newfound exception carved out somehow in Vieth. The exceptionality of this reasoning, as
the basis for gerrymandering jurisprudence that followed, has been overlooked and overshadowed by the search for objective standards to satisfy
Justice Kennedy after Vieth and LULAC.
It is worth noting that Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy’s insistence on
an ironclad standard for partisan gerrymandering can be understood largely

142. Id. at 315.
143. Id. at 312.
144. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
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as a normative misdirection. If the Court had been determined to curb partisan gerrymandering, it certainly could have chosen any of the Vieth dissenters’ standards, and lower courts could have then operationalized the
standard with the multitude of quantitative measures of partisan bias and
asymmetry in political science available even then.145 Political scientists offered ready measures of partisan effect, quantifying any partisan asymmetry,
that lower courts could have used case by case to define a threshold level of
partisan asymmetry beyond which the state risked unconstitutionality.146
Through case-by-case adjudication, lower courts would have helped define
and distinguish an unconstitutionally excessive partisan gerrymander from a
permissible gerrymander, with reference to both quantitative and qualitative
markers that emerged as important over time.147
In Vieth itself, Justice Kennedy cited the example of Baker v. Carr148
because just this pattern of events occurred in the development of the one
person, one vote rule. The Court announced a vague principle of one person, one vote in Baker and Reynolds v. Sims, and lower courts filled in most
of the doctrinal details through case by case adjudication across a diverse set
of facts and cases.149 The result—a rule of nearly exact equipopulation in
congressional districting and 10 percent leeway in deviation for state and
local districting, along with caveats and exceptions150—was not specifically
contemplated by the Court in Reynolds, nor is it elegantly theorized by any
means. Still, the Court’s decision gave lower courts a green light to act on
the Court’s imperative of reining in severe malapportionment without the
Court comprehensively defining the limits of one person, one vote ex
ante.151 Just so, Vieth could have roughly articulated a standard that defines
145. See, e.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (castigating the judgment in
Vieth as “a failure of judicial will”); id. at 348 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing quantitative
methods available to analyze population compactness).
146. See id. at 348 n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting). Plaintiffs, perhaps discouraged by LULAC,
did not predicate gerrymandering claims on these measures until Whitford v. Gill. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 96, at 846–47 (reporting that no post-LULAC plaintiffs proposed symmetry-based gerrymandering claims).
147. Indeed, if the Court affirms in Whitford, lower courts would subsequently engage in
precisely this case-by-case process. Lower courts would apply whatever methodology the Court
endorses, whether it is the efficiency gap in Whitford or otherwise. Even with such methodology, lower courts still have much to decide through case-by-case consideration. For instance,
applying the lower court reasoning in Whitford, lower courts would need to decide fact intensively, case by case, whether the state exhibited the requisite partisan intent and whether any
partisan effect can be justified by legitimate state prerogatives or other neutral districting factors. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 903–04, 915 (W.D. Wis. 2016), prob. juris.
postponed to hearing on the merits, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017).
148. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 310 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
149. See generally Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker’s Promise, Equal Protection, and the Modern
Redistricting Revolution: A Plea for Rationality, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1353 (2002) (describing this
doctrinal progression).
150. See Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass’n v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Elections, 827 F.3d 333, 340–41
(4th Cir. 2016).
151. See Richard H. Pildes, Commentary, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 Va. L.
Rev. 1605, 1612 (1999) (“In theory and in doctrine, we can often identify what is troublingly
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only the most egregious partisan gerrymanders as unconstitutional. Lower
courts then would have applied that underinclusive standard against partisan gerrymanders as they appeared without an antecedent, perfectly theorized model of fair and effective representation sought by Justice Kennedy in
Vieth.152 Even in the absence of a standard that maps pristinely onto consensus about partisan gerrymandering, lower courts could have acted against
the worst examples of partisan gerrymandering if the Court were so
determined.153
The problem in Vieth was that too few justices were so determined
against partisan gerrymandering. In Justice Kennedy’s case, for example, the
problem was not simply the absence of sufficient consensus about objective
standards for judging partisanship, but also that he was insufficiently motivated to strike against partisan gerrymandering as a general matter. Justice
Kennedy, after all, refused in Vieth itself to strike down the Pennsylvania
congressional redistricting in question there, and he later refused to strike
down a then-rare mid-decade redistricting in LULAC v. Perry as well.
In sum, courts acknowledge that partisanship regularly motivates
lawmakers in legislating and administering all kinds of law, particularly law
regulating the electoral process. This type of partisanship is permissible and
lawful in the narrow sense that its presence does not per se disqualify the
subject lawmaking as unconstitutional. Partisanship therefore is not like invidious racially discriminatory intent whereby its simple presence in the lawmaking process can serve as grounds for invalidation or otherwise define a
protected class under equal protection. But partisanship is an illegitimate
state purpose, even if it is not per se illegal. Courts pragmatically acquiesce
to government partisanship as a fact of the lawmaking process but should
not accept it as a legitimate basis for lawmaking. This is an important point,
not a technical quibble. Government partisanship is tolerated as a government motivation in lawmaking as a factual matter but cannot serve as a
basis for lawmaking. Justice Scalia cleverly extended the former fact to the
undermine the latter in Vieth. He successfully extended earlier judicial tolerance for government partisanship into new constitutional acceptance of partisanship as a legitimate state interest for lawmaking, a wholly different
proposition.

unfair, unequal, or wrong without a precise standard of what is optimally fair, equal, or
right.”).
152. See Michael S. Kang, When Courts Won’t Make Law: Partisan Gerrymandering and a
Structural Approach to the Law of Democracy, 68 Ohio St. L.J. 1097, 1105–06 (2007).
153. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Domesticating the Gerrymander: An Essay on Standards, Fair
Representation, and the Necessary Question of Judicial Will, 14 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 423,
440–41 (2005).
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II. The Problem of Government Partisanship in
Constitutional Law
In this Part, I describe a norm against government partisanship across
constitutional law. If Justice Scalia was right in Vieth that an important degree of government partisanship is permissible in redistricting, then redistricting as such is the glaring exception in constitutional law. Justice Scalia’s
insistence runs against a broader norm against government partisanship that
has appeared under the First Amendment, Elections Clause, and Equal Protection Clause, even applied to redistricting itself. The constitutional problem is not the magnitude of partisan effect, but instead the fact of
government discrimination based on political party in the regulation of the
democratic process. Where the Constitution regulates the law of democracy,
courts often have acted to cut off official government partisanship, irrespective of how extreme or moderate the partisanship, and they are now increasingly doing so in response to today’s hyperpolarized partisanship.
A. First Amendment Law
Justice Kennedy’s invocation of the First Amendment in Vieth was surprising. Equal protection jurisprudence had always guided judicial review of
partisan gerrymandering.154 Courts asked whether the deliberate manipulation of district lines enabled the majority party to control a greater proportion of seats than it otherwise would be fairly entitled to claim. The trouble,
as always, was in determining the fair entitlement under any inevitably contestable normative baseline. In Vieth, Justice Kennedy continued this
storyline by endorsing gerrymandering’s justiciability under equal protection and tasking litigants and courts with inventing an objective measure of
partisan unfairness that would rescue him from the murkiness of a contestable normative baseline and definitively identify fair entitlements for him.155
Yet in the midst of his opinion Justice Kennedy mysteriously veered off to
suggest that “[t]he First Amendment may be the more relevant constitutional in future cases that allege unconstitutional partisan
gerrymandering.”156
The unexpected invocation of the First Amendment offers a healthy reminder of how firmly entrenched the requirement of government nonpartisanship is in the rest of constitutional law. As Justice Kennedy pointed out,
the First Amendment instantiates a powerful interest against state action
“burdening or penalizing citizens because of their participation in the electoral process, their voting history, their association with a political party, or
154. See Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and Political Competition, 30 Nova L. Rev.
253, 254 (2006) (explaining that “litigants and the Court have relied primarily on the Equal
Protection Clause to challenge and judge the structure of election districts”).
155. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 311–13 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
156. Id. at 314.
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their expression of political views.”157 The concern is precisely the plaintiffs’
constitutional complaint in any partisan gerrymandering case.158 They argue
that the state discriminated to disadvantage the plaintiffs’ party’s electoral
prospects and favor the majority party’s.159 This discrimination occurred not
incidentally in pursuit of other state interests in redistricting but intentionally, as a partisan plan to punish those with competing political views and
associations.160
The best illustration of this norm against government partisanship in
First Amendment law is the political patronage cases. For this reason, Justice
Stevens repeatedly cited them in his gerrymandering opinions as foundation
for the principle.161 In the patronage cases, the Court struck down traditional practices of political patronage where government officials regularly
replaced incumbent staff with fellow partisans as a reward for their party
work and loyalty.162 Over a series of decisions, the Court outlawed longstanding historical practices, particularly in big cities, that underpinned major party politics and mass mobilization.163 In this light, what is odd about
Vieth is how blithely Justice Scalia accepted intentional partisanship in districting against this backdrop.164
The patronage cases flowed from a basic constitutional norm against
official government partisanship. The government may not condition government employment decisions on partisan affiliation because doing so violates constitutional prohibitions on government favoritism based on political
beliefs.165 As the Court explained, patronage practices not only burden political belief under the First Amendment, but also impose a structural harm on
the democratic process.166 Patronage, by conditioning public employment
on party loyalty, enables the incumbent government to “starve political opposition by commanding partisan support, financial and otherwise.”167 The
Court reasoned that patronage impermissibly enlists government authority
for partisan purposes and “thus tips the electoral process in favor of the
incumbent party.”168 The only exception to this constitutional prohibition
157. Id.
158. E.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 115 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“[T]his suit
was filed by several Indiana Democrats . . . alleging that the 1981 reapportionment plans
constituted a political gerrymander intended to disadvantage Democrats.”).
159. E.g., id.
160. E.g., id.
161. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 324–25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. E.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S.
507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
163. E.g., Rutan, 497 U.S. at 75.
164. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 293–94 (plurality opinion).
165. E.g., Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356–57.
166. Id. at 356.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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on party patronage applies to policymaking employees for whom partisanship serves as a critical proxy for political kinship intrinsic to the position.169
In familiar fashion, government employment based on partisanship can be
justified only when the government can claim the use of partisanship for an
important coinciding interest.170
In the general case, the constitutional bar on party patronage does not
vary with the egregiousness of the partisanship. A constitutional violation
arises from the simple fact that the employment decision was based on partisanship rather than legitimate hiring criteria, not that the magnitude of
partisanship exceeded some allowable minimum amount. Nor does the case
law allow for the government to hire and fire a small number of employees
based on partisanship, drawing a constitutional bar only at some higher
threshold or percentage of government employees. The problem is simply
that partisanship drives the government decision and disqualifies it in the
absence of other legitimate hiring justification.171 The basic constitutional
prohibition on government partisanship is one of kind, not degree.
Of course, courts have not always needed to lead the charge in reifying a
norm of government nonpartisanship. The constitutional rule against party
patronage practically applies only to the minority of non–civil service employees because legislatures already have preempted such practices for civil
service employees with statutory prohibitions on government politicking
and electioneering.172 At the federal level, the Pendleton and Hatch Acts inaugurated legal restrictions on lawmakers from using their capacities as government officials and control over state authority for partisan purposes.173 In
similar fashion, campaign finance laws regularly prohibit lawmakers from
using government resources to fundraise and electioneer.174 A norm against
government partisanship has been sufficiently internalized as a matter of
self-regulation that courts have not needed to impose it on elected officials
much beyond the context of the Court’s patronage cases.
To be clear, elected officials themselves are party actors free to politick
and electioneer on a partisan basis in their individual capacities as citizens,
candidates, and political figures. Nothing in a norm against government partisanship prohibits a party official from endorsing other candidates or
campaigning along party lines, or advancing partisan priorities as a policy
169. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 71 n.5 (1990).
170. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980).
171. See Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016) (holding that the government’s partisan reason for its employment decision is decisive, not the degree to which the
government actually impedes protected activity).
172. See, e.g., Megan Glasheen, Student Article, Patronage Employment Practice and the
First Amendment, 34 How. L.J. 663, 667–68 (1991) (“All of the states have enacted some form
of civil service legislation.”).
173. See, e.g., Louis Lawrence Boyle, Reforming Civil Service Reform: Should the Federal
Government Continue to Regulate State and Local Government Employees?, 7 J.L. & Pol. 243,
246–60 (1991) (describing this history).
174. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 602 (2012).
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agenda—such activities define democratic elections and public life. The distinction is that lawmakers cannot leverage official state action for such explicitly partisan activities.
As an example, lawmakers cannot pass a law that expressly and officially
endorses certain candidates or parties, because it would constitute the
lawmakers not merely politicking on an individual basis but manipulating
the state as a partisan organ to sponsor their parochial cause.175 To use Robert Post’s words, the government in such a case would “act in its own name
as a representative of the community”176 and violate overlapping constitutional norms against government partisanship and viewpoint discrimination. Although this precise hypothetical apparently has never taken place, or
at least has not yet been litigated in a reported case, judges and scholars have
regularly cited this exact hypothetical to illustrate the nonpartisanship principle. Justices Black and Harlan drew upon the hypothetical of a state fund
for partisan electioneering to make their case against compulsory union
dues for the same such purposes in the companion cases International Ass’n
of Machinists v. Street and Lathrop v. Donohue. Arguing by analogy, they
asserted it went without saying that the state would not be permitted under
the First Amendment to “create a fund to be used in helping certain political
parties or groups favored by the Government to elect their candidates.”177
More recently, Justice Scalia himself observed in National Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley that “it would be unconstitutional for the government to give
money to an organization devoted to the promotion of candidates nominated by the Republican Party” or “for the government itself to promote
candidates nominated by the Republican Party.”178 The same hypothetical of
official government partisanship again arose in oral argument for Walker v.
Sons of Confederate Veterans, when Justice Kagan asked skeptically whether a
state could produce a “Vote Republican” but not a “Vote Democrat” license
plate.179 In each instance, justices were dismissive of official government partisanship as an absurd hypothetical illustrative of what is clearly
forbidden.180
175. Thanks to Pam Karlan for posing this hypothetical to me long ago.
176. Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 Yale L.J. 151, 184 (1996) (emphasis omitted).
177. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 788 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting);
Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 853 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Street, 367 U.S. at 788).
178. 524 U.S. 569, 598 n.3 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Oddly, though,
Justice Scalia maintained that he did “not think that that unconstitutionality has anything to
do with the First Amendment.” Id.
179. See Frederick Schauer, Not Just About License Plates: Walker v. Sons of Confederate
Veterans, Government Speech, and Doctrinal Overlap in the First Amendment, 2015 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 265, 274 n.23.
180. See also Schulz v. State, 654 N.E.2d 1226, 1230 (N.Y. 1995) (asserting it “unassailable
that the use of public funds . . . to pay for the production and distribution of campaign
materials for a political party or a political candidate or partisan cause in any election” would
be unconstitutional); Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1976) (“A fundamental precept of
this nation’s democratic electoral process is that the government may not ‘take sides’ in election contests or bestow an unfair advantage on one of several competing factions.”).
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Scholars widely agree along these lines. Justice Kagan, while still a law
professor at the University of Chicago, wrote that a law “prohibiting the use
of billboards for political advertisements supporting Democrats” would be
obviously unconstitutional as prohibited viewpoint discrimination, even if a
law prohibiting the use of billboards for all political advertisements might be
able to pass constitutional standards as merely content based.181 Nelson
Tebbe likewise dismisses the constitutionality of “an official [government]
campaign urging citizens to ‘Vote Democrat’ in the days leading up to a
critical election.”182 He argues that government politicking has been largely
barred extrajudicially by statute and regulation, rather than judicial decision,
but it would nonetheless violate constitutional commitments to an independent democratic process as a check on the government and to collective selfdetermination motivated by public interests.183 Abner Greene agrees that the
government cannot engage in official speech that “favors views supportive of
the current administration or majority party while disfavoring views of the
opposition.”184 He argues that such government speech would violate the
First Amendment because such “viewpoint-based funding tends toward entrenching the current ruling party, and blocks the paths of political
change.”185 Fred Schauer adds that the First Amendment rarely restricts government speech but agrees that “if parties or officials in power use their
control over government resources to secure their own reelection, the dangers to the democratic processes, and thus to larger First Amendment concerns, again seem apparent.”186
For all these reasons, invocation of the First Amendment against partisan gerrymandering is intuitively apt, if not immediately obvious to all. The
robust First Amendment interest against government partisanship dovetails
with concerns about deliberate manipulation of district lines by the government to advantage the majority party at the expense of the opposition. Not
only did Justice Kennedy refer to the First Amendment in Vieth, but Justice
Stevens too cited the patronage decisions for the basic constitutional principle of government nonpartisanship. Justice Stevens argued the patronage
cases demonstrate, contrary to Justice Scalia’s claims, that “partisanship is
not always as benign a consideration as the plurality appears to assume.”187
If it is unconstitutional for the state to discriminate on the basis of politics
181. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 444 (1996).
182. Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 648, 651 (2013).
183. Id. at 669–70.
184. Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 37 (2000).
185. Id. at 38; see also Levitt, supra note 14 (manuscript at 23–24) (criticizing a tax on
members of only one party in similar terms).
186. Schauer, supra note 179, at 274; see also Larry Alexander, Is There a Right of
Freedom of Expression? 90, 101–02 (2005); Lori A. Ringhand, Voter Viewpoint Discrimination: A First Amendment Challenge to Voter Participation Restrictions, 13 Election L.J. 288, 289
(2014).
187. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 326 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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for employment, Justice Stevens argued that “[i]t follows that political affiliation is not an appropriate standard for excluding voters from a congressional district.”188
In fact, the Court earlier had offered similar reasoning in the so-called
partisan fencing case of Carrington v. Rash.189 In facts unthinkable today, the
Texas Constitution once disqualified from voting in state elections any member of the U.S. military who moved to the state while in active service.190 The
state defended this denial of the vote to otherwise eligible residents by citing
an interest in protecting the Texas electorate from “infiltration by transients”
and becoming overwhelmed by the “concentrated balloting of military personnel.”191 The Court in Carrington struck down as unconstitutional this
deliberate “ ‘fencing out’ from the franchise” of certain citizens based on
their political views.192 The state was entitled to condition eligibility to vote
on bona fide residency, but the state here was impermissibly depriving military members of the vote because of “a fear of the political views of a political group.”193
In Shapiro v. McManus, a federal district court recently applied similar
reasoning in allowing a First Amendment challenge to a Maryland partisan
gerrymander. The district court cited the patronage cases for “the fundamental principle that the government may not penalize citizens because of
how they have exercised their First Amendment rights.”194 The government
strategically shifted Republican voters from the traditionally Republican
Sixth Congressional District to the traditionally Democratic Eighth District.195 The Republican voters’ former representative in the Sixth District
lost the subsequent election to a Democratic challenger, while they themselves were outvoted by a two-to-one Democratic majority in the Eighth
District.196 The result of the gerrymander was that Democrats won control
of both districts and these Republican voters, the plaintiffs in Shapiro, were
now represented by a Democrat in a new district rather than their former
in-party Republican incumbent.197 The district court held that government
188. Id. at 325; see also Baldus v. Members of the Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., 849 F.
Supp. 2d 840, 853 (E.D. Wis. 2012) (“If, as the Supreme Court has held, the First Amendment
protects persons from politically-based hiring decisions, then perhaps the Court will find some
day that the First Amendment also protects persons against state action that intentionally uses
their partisan affiliation to affect the weight of their vote.” (citations omitted)).
189. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
190. Carrington, 380 U.S. at 89.
191. Id. at 93.
192. Id. at 94.
193. Id. at 93–94.
194. 203 F. Supp. 3d 579, 596, 598 (D. Md. 2016); see also Anne Arundel Cty. Republican
Cent. Comm. v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 781 F. Supp. 394, 410 (D. Md. 1991)
(Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (articulating similar reasoning in dissent from an earlier case), aff’d
mem., 504 U.S. 938 (1992).
195. Shapiro, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 587–88.
196. Id. at 588.
197. Id.
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could not “burden the representational rights of certain citizens because of
how they had voted in the past and the political party with which they affiliated.”198 Just as government could not punish its employees for their political views, the court reasoned, the government could not purposely
disadvantage voters in redistricting for their political views by tangibly diminishing the chance for electoral success.199
Admittedly, Shapiro is exceptional in allowing a First Amendment claim
against partisan gerrymandering since Vieth. Other district courts to have
considered such a theory have rejected it on the ground that the First
Amendment simply does not apply to the burdening of representational
rights in districting.200 These courts routinely defer to Vieth as authority
against constitutional challenges of redistricting even though the plaintiffs in
these cases sue under the First Amendment, rather than bringing Fourteenth
Amendment claims as analyzed in Vieth.201 For most courts, Vieth still casts
a dark shadow of presumptive skepticism about partisan gerrymandering
claims regardless of the doctrinal specifics.202 More importantly, these courts
uniformly find that the plaintiffs fail to show a cognizable injury under the
First Amendment because they are still, in the words of one court, “every bit
as a free . . . to run for office, express their political views, endorse and
campaign for their candidates, vote, or otherwise influence the political process through their expression.”203 These courts therefore seem to reason that
a First Amendment claim based on government discrimination must allege
some affirmative restriction on the plaintiffs’ First Amendment activity. The
injury caused by partisan gerrymandering, these courts reason, is instead a
diminishment in the chance for electoral success. In the absence of a constitutional guarantee of any political success in the first place, they conclude
there cannot be a claim to constitutional harm and violation of right.204 In
short, district courts considering this First Amendment claim convert it essentially into one brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, as in Vieth,
about representational injury. It is no surprise then that these lower courts
198. Id. at 597.
199. Id.
200. See Comm. for a Fair & Balanced Map v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 835 F. Supp. 2d
575 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Radogno v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 1:11-cv-04884, 2011 WL
5025251, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2011); Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-cv-0997-BBM, 2006 WL
1341302, at *15–20 (N.D. Ga. May 16, 2006). For earlier cases predating the Court’s decision
in Vieth, see Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 548 (M.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 537
U.S. 802 (2002); Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913, 927–28 (4th Cir. 1981); and Badham v.
Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 675 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989).
201. See, e.g., Comm. for a Fair & Balanced Map, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 575.
202. See, e.g., id.
203. Kidd, 2006 WL 1341302, at *17.
204. See, e.g., Comm. for a Fair & Balanced Map, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 575 (“[W]hile it is
true that the redistricting plan undoubtedly means that one party is more likely to be victorious in any given district, the First Amendment . . . does not ensure that all points of view are
equally likely to prevail.” (quoting League of Women Voters v. Quinn, No. 1:11-cv–5569, 2011
WL 5143044, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2011))).
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end up in the same place as the Court itself reached in Vieth—no baseline or
manageable standard for measuring representational harm, so no constitutional claim.
The alleged harm from partisan gerrymandering under the First
Amendment is not just a diminishment in chances of electoral victory, but
the constitutional harm of purposeful government discrimination. Just as it
would be unconstitutional for the government to favor Democrats over
Republicans in employment decisions, or to endorse the Democratic Party
over the Republican Party, the claim is that it would be similarly unconstitutional for the government to intentionally discriminate in favor of Democrats over Republicans in the redistricting process. The harm is not merely
the tangible diminishment in electoral success resulting from gerrymandering, but the intentional government effort to favor one party over the other,
at least in the absence of a neutral government justification for its decisions.
As the Shapiro court rightly put it, the core harm is when “the legislature
specifically intended to burden the representational rights of certain citizens
because of how they had voted in the past and the political party with which
they had affiliated.”205 The fact that a gerrymander reduces those citizens’
chances of electoral victory is critical evidence of the government’s discriminatory purpose rather than the exclusive harm itself.
Party members may not have any constitutional entitlement to electoral
success, but they should have a constitutional expectation against the government purposefully burdening their representational interests based on
their partisan affiliation and beliefs. Furthermore, the government may take
political considerations into account in redistricting, just as the Court has
repeatedly assured.206 As the Shapiro court explained, “[W]hat implicates the
First Amendment’s prohibition on retaliation is not the use of data reflecting
citizens’ voting history and party affiliation, but the use of such data for the
purpose of making it harder for a particular group of voters to achieve electoral success.”207 The government can consider the inherently political consequences of redistricting and even attend to political interests in the
process. It may even pursue legitimate government interests in redistricting,
like compliance with the Voting Rights Act, in ways that practically benefit
one party more than another. There is no guarantee of nondiscriminatory
results in redistricting, at least not yet under existing law. Instead, what
would be prohibited under this approach is purposeful government discrimination in redistricting against a party or based on political beliefs. This
approach refers back to the overarching constitutional norm of government
nonpartisanship that echoes through other areas of constitutional law.

205. Shapiro v. McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d 579, 597 (D. Md. 2016).
206. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) (“The reality is that districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political consequences.”).
207. Shapiro, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 596.
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B. Equal Protection and Second-Order Review of Redistricting
Despite Vieth’s ambivalence toward partisan gerrymandering, the constitutional norm of government nonpartisanship still exercises an influence
in equal protection challenges to redistricting. Admittedly, Vieth sent a clear
signal to lower courts that some partisanship in redistricting is lawful and
permissible. To establish an equal protection claim against partisan gerrymandering, plaintiffs needed to objectively demarcate lawful partisanship
from some greater, impermissible level of excessive partisanship that equal
protection should not tolerate.208 As a result, Vieth largely stalled equal protection challenges to partisan gerrymandering as lower courts struggled to
grapple with Vieth’s acquiescence to common partisanship in redistricting.
Courts generally dismissed these challenges, sometimes dismissing them
under the old Bandemer standard, sometimes finding that the plaintiffs
failed to offer a satisfactory new standard under Vieth, and sometimes concluding that such claims were no longer justiciable after Vieth.209 Notwithstanding Vieth’s impact, however, courts expressed the norm against
government partisanship in related but distinct challenges to gerrymandering under equal protection—as violations of one person, one vote.
Courts have developed what has been called a “second-order” judicial
check on partisan gerrymandering through the one person, one vote doctrine.210 In Larios v. Cox, Republicans challenged the post-2000 Georgia state
legislative redistricting under one person, one vote.211 Georgia Democrats at
the time of the redistricting maintained a tenuous majority in both houses
that they intended to protect by stretching to the limit all traditional redistricting criteria. The Democrats believed their redistricting would qualify for
an unofficial “safe harbor” against one person, one vote challenges, based on
previous court rulings, if they kept the population deviation between the
largest to the smallest district under 10 percent.212 They thus produced a
map with a maximum deviation of 9.98 percent, just barely within their
putative safe harbor.213 By careful design, however, it was overwhelmingly
the Republican-leaning districts that were overpopulated. The district court
found that sixty-nine overpopulated districts were Republican-leaning compared to just thirty Democratic-leaning ones.214 Republican voting strength
was therefore packed into fewer districts, while expected Democratic voters
were spread more efficiently across more districts, a hallmark of partisan
208. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
209. See Kang, supra note 152, at 1111–12 (surveying lower court decisions in Vieth’s
wake).
210. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line? Judicial Review of
Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 567 (2004).
211. 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga.) (per curiam), aff’d mem., 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
212. See Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1325.
213. Id. at 1352.
214. See id. at 1331.
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gerrymandering. Furthermore, the resulting partisan gerrymander pitted
forty-seven Republican incumbents against other incumbents, including half
the Republican caucus in the lower house, compared to only nine out of 105
Democratic incumbents forced to face a fellow incumbent.215 The predictable result was that twenty-two Republican incumbents lost in the subsequent 2002 elections compared to just three Democrats.216 Democrats
managed to extend their majority in the House, despite state demographics
running dramatically away from their party.217 They nearly retained the state
senate before four victorious Democratic senators switched parties immediately after the election to hand the Republicans a new majority.218
Although the district court dismissed the Republican plaintiffs’
Bandemer claims of unconstitutional gerrymandering, the district court instead struck down the Democratic gerrymander for violating one person,
one vote. The court explained that population deviations satisfy the requirement of one person, one vote only when supported by legitimate state interests in redistricting, but not when tainted by arbitrariness or
discrimination.219 The state could defend population deviations from one
person, one vote as necessary to pursue traditional redistricting criteria, including incumbency protection, respect for political subdivisions, and preservation of previous district cores, among other things. The Georgia
redistricting, though, was “not supported by any legitimate, consistentlyapplied state interests,” and rather resulted from the “blatantly partisan and
discriminatory” objective of advantaging Democratic incumbents and voters
in southern Georgia and inner-city Atlanta who favored them.220 While the
state pointed to traditional redistricting criteria to explain its population
deviations, the court observed that the state selectively pursued them only
when they favored Democrats, taking pains to protect only Democratic incumbents and the cores of mainly Democratic districts at the expense of
Republicans.221 The court concluded that one person, one vote requires “at
least some plausible and consistently applied state interest to justify it,” and
critically, the obvious partisanship motivating the Georgia redistricting did
not qualify as a legitimate state interest for this purpose.222
Only two months after the Supreme Court put a damper on gerrymandering claims in Vieth, it summarily affirmed the district court decision in

215. See id. at 1329–30.
216. See id.
217. Republicans won a comfortable majority of votes statewide in the 2002 elections
while losing a majority of the legislative races in both houses. See Larios v. Cox, 542 U.S. 947,
949 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring).
218. Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1326–27.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1347, 1352–53.
221. Id. at 1347–51.
222. Id. at 1352.
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Larios.223 In unusual concurring and dissenting opinions to summary affirmance, Justices Stevens and Scalia replayed their colloquy from Vieth. Justice Stevens cheered this new indirect method of challenging partisan
gerrymanders under one person, one vote as “the only clear limitation on
improper districting practices” after Vieth.224 Joined again by Justice Breyer,
he decried the Georgia redistricting as “an impermissible partisan gerrymander” that violated the state’s “fundamental duty to govern impartially.”225 Justice Scalia countered that summary affirmance in Larios
contradicted the Court’s freshly minted decision in Vieth. The problem with
Larios, he insisted, was that the district court assumed that partisanship was
not a traditional redistricting criterion that would constitutionally justify
deviations from one person, one vote.226 But according to Justice Scalia,
Vieth itself demonstrated that “all but one of the Justices agreed that it is a
traditional criterion, and a constitutional one, so long as it does not go too
far.”227 Nonetheless, the Court summarily affirmed Larios, notwithstanding
any conflict with Vieth.228
The odd consequence is that courts are baffled under Vieth by direct
equal protection claims of unconstitutional gerrymandering, but under
Larios, they are empowered to recognize indirect claims of essentially the
same thing on the alternate grounds of one person, one vote. For this reason, Sam Issacharoff and Pam Karlan dub this indirect claim as “secondorder adjudication of political gerrymandering” that applies a haphazard
and inconsistent restraint on partisanship in redistricting.229 Setting aside its
effectiveness in restraining partisan gerrymandering, Larios and the redirection of gerrymandering claims into one person, one vote demonstrate the
influence of the constitutional norm of government nondiscrimination.
Where Vieth seems to cut off judicial intervention, the norm arguably compels its own hydraulic reassertion elsewhere through alternate constitutional
means because the principle against government partisanship is so compelling in this context.
Even before Larios, lower courts were willing to strike down partisan
gerrymanders under one person, one vote where the partisan purpose
seemed sufficiently egregious. In Hulme v. Madison County, the district
court struck down a county board reapportionment with a maximum deviation of just 9.3 percent because of “boorish” partisanship that “demonstrated the worst of politics.”230 What offended the district court in Hulme
223. 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
224. Larios, 542 U.S. at 949 (Stevens, J., concurring).
225. Id. at 950–51 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 341 (2004) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
226. Id. at 952 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227. Id.
228. See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1310 (2016).
229. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 210, at 567–69.
230. 188 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1044, 1047, 1051, 1055–56 (S.D. Ill. 2001).
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was not the partisan extremeness of the reapportionment map, which merited little mention from the court, but instead the overweening partisan malice pervading the redistricting process.231 A Democratic member of the
county board announced outright at a preliminary meeting that the process
“was going to be partisan” and later, the chairman of the apportionment
committee responded to Republican complaints about the process by answering that “[w]e are going to shove it [the map] up your f
; ass and
you are going to like it, and I’ll f
any Republican I can.”232 Based on
ample evidence of this sort about the process, the district court concluded
that the chairman’s intent was “to create districts that would not simply
disadvantage Republican members of the Board, but ‘cannibalize’ their districts to the greatest extent possible.”233 Worse, the government did not offer
any state policy to justify the resulting population deviation from one person, one vote.234 It instead relied entirely on what it saw an absolute 10
percent safe harbor, not unlike the state of Georgia in Larios.235 Indeed,
courts routinely permit population deviations of less than 10 percent for
state and local districts under one person, one vote when such deviations are
justified in terms of traditional redistricting criteria.236 But here the district
court struck down the reapportionment within this safe harbor when the
undeniable explanation for the deviation was raw partisanship. The obvious
partisan purpose throughout the process, without intervening state interests
to justify the government’s deviation from equipopulosity, implored the district court to rule against it despite minimal analysis of the redistricting’s
actual effects.
Even in Vieth itself, the district court below actually struck down the
Pennsylvania congressional reapportionment on one person, one vote
grounds.237 The population deviation in Vieth was trivial, a difference of
nineteen voters from largest to smallest across nineteen districts.238 Yet again,
these details of the redistricting mattered less than what the court suspected
was obvious partisanship motivating the choices in the absence of any countervailing explanation. The district court found the state’s explanation of the
population deviation as necessary to avoid splitting voting precincts to be
“mere pretext,” with “logical inconsistency . . . so deep that it causes us to
231. See Hulme, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1051–52.
232. See id. at 1051.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1052 (“Defendants have not offered any state (governmental) policy to justify
the plan’s population disparity.”).
235. See id.
236. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983); Margaret H. Lemos & Alex Stein,
Strategic Enforcement, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 9, 41–43 (2010) (describing the “ten percent rule” and
collecting cases); Adam Raviv, Unsafe Harbors: One Person, One Vote and Partisan Redistricting,
7 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1001, 1012-14 (2005) (describing the “Ten Percent Rule”).
237. See Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 195 F. Supp. 2d 672, 678 (M.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 537
U.S. 802 (2002).
238. Id. at 674.
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pause and consider the sincerity of such proffer.”239 The court noted that an
alternative map with zero deviation would have been simple to produce and
implied that partisanship was to blame.240 To the degree that the redistricting
retained cores of prior districts, it did so only for Republican incumbents,
and to the degree that it supposedly strove to avoid contests between incumbents, it still pitted five Democratic incumbents and only one Republican
incumbent against a fellow incumbent.241 Again the government’s bald partisanship mattered more than the political result of the putative violation, a
trivial nineteen-person population deviation dwarfed by the statistical margin of error.
Post-Larios, courts have further refined this analysis under one person,
one vote. In Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, Justice
Breyer’s opinion for a unanimous Supreme Court explained that the plaintiffs must show it is more probable than not that the population deviation of
less than 10 percent “reflects the predominance of illegitimate reapportionment factors rather than the ‘legitimate considerations’ ” that the Court has
previously recognized as traditional districting criteria.242 In that case, the
plaintiffs alleged that the state’s bipartisan redistricting commission produced a state legislative map that deviated from equipopulosity because of
“the Commission’s political efforts to help the Democratic Party.”243 They
pointed to the fact that, similar to Larios, Democratic-leaning districts
tended toward underpopulation and Republican-leaning districts tended toward overpopulation, as signal evidence of this partisanship.244 Still, the
Court rejected this claim because the independent commission’s process and
deliberations supported the district court’s findings that the commission
was instead motivated primarily by good-faith efforts to comply with the
Voting Rights Act in producing a population deviation of 4.07 percent.245
This conclusion was obviously bolstered by the fact that the redistricting was
conducted by an independent commission, chosen by a putatively apolitical
and bipartisan method, rather than the usual legislative process.246
Harris adapts Justice Stevens and Breyer’s approach to partisan gerrymandering in Vieth to one person, one vote. Although Justice Stevens had
239. Id. at 677.
240. Id. at 678 (“It has been conclusively proven that it is possible to draw a congressional
district map with zero population deviation amongst districts without splitting any
precincts.”).
241. Id.
242. 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1304, 1307 (2016).
243. See Harris, 136 S. Ct. at 1305, 1307.
244. See id. at 1309.
245. Id. at 1308–09; see also Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d
1042, 1080 (D. Ariz. 2014) (concluding that “compliance with the Voting Rights Act is a legitimate state policy that can justify minor population deviations, that . . . the map in large part
resulted from this goal, and that plaintiffs have failed to show that other, illegitimate motivations predominated”), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1301 (2016).
246. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652,
2661–62 (2015) (describing the selection method, enacted by popular initiative).
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since retired from the Court, Justice Breyer’s opinion in Harris adopted Stevens’s proposed test from Vieth that the plaintiffs prove partisanship, as an
illegitimate factor in redistricting, predominated over other legitimate considerations.247 Justice Breyer acknowledged that the Harris district court
found “partisanship played some role” in the commission’s redistricting
work.248 Nonetheless, the fact of partisanship in the process by itself did not
automatically disqualify the resulting plan. Partisan motive is not forbidden,
but partisan purpose is illegitimate in redistricting such that the government
could not rely exclusively on partisan interests to justify the plan against an
equal protection challenge. In crafting this analysis, Justice Breyer’s opinion
cited Larios with approval, contrasting the findings there with Harris.249 As a
technical matter, Justice Breyer explicitly reserved the question whether
“partisanship is an illegitimate redistricting factor.”250 The reasoning of Harris, though, makes clear that it is. Justice Breyer explained that “[n]o legitimate purposes could explain” the population deviations in Larios,251 but of
course, the district court there found that only regional favoritism and partisanship could explain them.252 If no legitimate purpose could explain the
population deviations in Larios, it is necessarily true that partisanship is not
a legitimate purpose in redistricting despite Justice Breyer’s gesture to reserve the question. With Justice Scalia’s death just months earlier, Justice
Breyer’s opinion in Harris so decided for a unanimous Court.
The Fourth Circuit promptly applied this approach in Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass’n v. Wake County Board of Elections.253 The court had previously,
before Harris, already denied dismissal of the plaintiffs’ one person, one vote
claims based on its belief that the Supreme Court in Larios “necessarily believed to be correct the district court’s rejection of discriminatory treatment
of incumbents from one party over those of another,” or at least its related
rejection of regional favoritism.254 Now on remand after Harris, the Fourth
Circuit asked whether plaintiffs had proved more probably than not that the
population deviations in the case reflected predominance of the illegitimate
247. See Harris, 136 S. Ct. at 1307; cf. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 336 (2004) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
248. Harris, 136 S. Ct. at 1309.
249. Id. at 1310.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1352–53 (N.D. Ga.) (per curiam) (“[The
plaintiffs] have also shown that the 9.98% population deviation in those plans are not supported by any legitimate, consistently-applied state interests but, rather, resulted from the arbitrary and discriminatory objective of increasing the political power of southern Georgia and
inner-city Atlanta . . . and from the systematic favoring of Democratic incumbents and the
corresponding attempts to eliminate as many Republican incumbents as possible.”), aff’d
mem., 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
253. 827 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2016).
254. Wright v. North Carolina, 787 F.3d 256, 267 (4th Cir. 2015).
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factor of “an intentional effort to create a significant . . . partisan advantage.”255 Focused on government partisan intent, the court found uncontroverted evidence that the “true motivation” of the redistricting there was to
“ensure Republican control . . . at the expense of Democrats.”256 The court
found the Republican redistricters’ alternate explanations to be pretextual
and instead credited the direct evidence of intent from witness testimony,
emails among Republicans, and expert testimony that the redistricting plan’s
partisan bias could have resulted only from an intentional effort to favor
Republicans.257 In addition, the required decennial reapportionment had
earlier taken place in compliance with one person, one vote.258 The Republican state government pushed through this second, mid-decade redistricting
of these county boards only after partisan control of the local school board
flipped from Republican to Democratic in 2011.259 This unnecessary and
unusual “re-redistricting” therefore resembled LULAC in baring the Republican state government’s partisan purposes, despite the fact that the county
boards in the case were nominally nonpartisan.260
As a result, courts now seem empowered as never before to strike down
partisan gerrymandering under one person, one vote. The courts above refused to recognize government partisanship as a legitimate redistricting consideration to justify even minor population deviations. Vieth and LULAC
therefore seem at odds with this judicial willingness to check government
partisanship in redistricting under one person, one vote. If partisanship by
itself cannot justify small population deviations under one person, one vote,
it is very difficult to square this fact with Justice Scalia’s insistence that partisanship in redistricting is a “traditional criterion, and a constitutional one,
so long as it does not go too far.”261
C. Election Administration and Voter Identification Laws
Support for a constitutional norm against government partisanship appears again in judicial review of election administration. First, the Court
explicitly invokes a nondiscrimination norm for state election administration under the Elections Clause. Second, the nondiscrimination norm gradually has emerged as a sub silentio influence in judicial decisions curbing
partisan voting restrictions, in particular voter identification requirements
and early voting cutbacks.

255. Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass’n, 827 F.3d at 345 (first citing Harris, 136 S. Ct. at 1307;
and then citing Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 947–49 (2004)).
256. Id. at 346.
257. See id. at 345–51.
258. See id. at 338.
259. See id.
260. See id. at 338 n.2.
261. Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 952 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The Elections Clause of Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution delegates
to the states authority to prescribe the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives.”262 As the Court has interpreted it, the Elections Clause permits state governments to create
procedural regulations for congressional elections to ensure the “integrity
and regularity of the election process.”263 Such regulations include the determination of election dates, methods of voting, regulation of ballot access,
and other election administration rules designed to produce “orderly, fair,
and honest elections ‘rather than chaos.’ ”264 The Court has also explained,
however, that the Elections Clause is only a delegation of authority to make
procedural regulations for congressional elections, and is not “a source of
power to dictate electoral outcomes, [or] to favor or disfavor a class of candidates.”265 In fact, the Court concluded from its historical survey that the
framers expressly understood the Elections Clause specifically not to permit
the states to disadvantage any particular class of candidates or impose additional qualifications for congressional candidacy.266
In other words, the Elections Clause too expresses a norm against purposeful government discrimination among candidates through the specification of election law. In Cook v. Gralike, the Court applied this familiar norm
under the Elections Clause to state-imposed ballot notations regarding candidates’ stances on term limits.267 The state of Missouri adopted a state constitutional amendment dictating that the statement “disregarded voters’
instruction on term limits” be printed on primary and election ballots
next to the name of a U.S. senator or congressional representative who failed
to take one of eight specified legislative acts in support of a term limits
amendment to the U.S. Constitution.268 The same law dictated that the statement “declined to pledge to support term limits” be printed on ballots
next to the name of any congressional challenger who refused to take a term
limits pledge promising to perform one of the aforementioned legislative
acts.269
The Court sensibly interpreted these required ballot notations as an attempt to favor candidates who support the term limits proposal contemplated by the amendment and disfavor candidates who did not.270 Although
the law did not disqualify or directly instruct candidates on term limits, the
262. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4.
263. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 835 (1995).
264. Id. at 834 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
265. Id. at 833–34.
266. Id. at 832–34.
267. 531 U.S. 510 (2001).
268. See Gralike, 531 U.S. at 514.
269. See id. at 514–15.
270. Id. at 524; see also Michael T. Morley, The New Elections Clause, 91 Notre Dame L.
Rev. Online 79, 104 (2016), http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr_online/vol91/iss2/3/ [https://
perma.cc/YLL2-SLDM] (agreeing that “printing derogatory warnings next to [candidates’]
names on the ballot, are direct and substantial handicaps specific to particular candidates”).
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law’s design was to “attach[ ] a concrete consequence to noncompliance.”271
The ballot notations penalized noncompliant candidates with a “Scarlet Letter” that even the law’s proponent admitted would disadvantage those candidates’ chances for electoral success.272 The discriminatory intent of the law
was to impose a derogatory signal to voters that would “handicap candidates
at the most crucial stage in the election process—the instant before the vote
is cast.”273 A unanimous Court had little trouble in finding the law unconstitutional under the Elections Clause as an attempt to disadvantage certain
candidates and “dictate electoral outcomes” on the basis of the candidates’
political positions.274
A few commentators argue that the Elections Clause might extend to
restrict partisan gerrymandering as well.275 Jamal Greene reasons that
whether the ballot notations represent attempts to “dictate electoral outcomes” is actually a closer call than whether partisan gerrymandering
does.276 As he puts it, even defenders of partisan gerrymandering must agree
that “in purposefully manipulating district lines, state legislators hope to
dictate electoral outcomes at least as much as proponents of pejorative ballot
labels do.”277 The plaintiffs in Vieth, though, did not press claims against
partisan gerrymandering under the Elections Clause,278 while the plaintiffs
in LULAC presented only a truncated version of this theory, which the district court rejected.279 Whatever the merits of their claim, the important
point is not that the Elections Clause necessarily applies directly to redistricting, but instead that we again find the familiar norm against government nondiscrimination in elections as a basic value in another area of
constitutional law.
The vitality of the nondiscrimination norm also helps explain how
courts have evolved their constitutional approach to voter identification laws
and other new cutbacks on voting rights. Voter identification laws were rare
in the United States until the passage of the Help America Vote Act in
271. Gralike, 531 U.S. at 524.
272. See id. at 525.
273. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964).
274. Id. at 526–27.
275. See Pildes, supra note 154; Jamal Greene, Note, Judging Partisan Gerrymanders Under
the Elections Clause, 114 Yale L.J. 1021, 1023–24 (2005); Note, A New Map: Partisan Gerrymandering as a Federalism Injury, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1196 (2004). But see Franita Tolson,
Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism, 2010 Utah L. Rev. 859, 877–88.
276. Greene, supra note 275, at 1023
277. Id. at 1023-24; cf. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 516 (E.D. Tex.) (Ward, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that “at some point a state exceeds the
power granted to it by the Elections Clause” with partisan gerrymandering), vacated sub nom.
Jackson v. Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004).
278. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 272 (2004) (plurality opinion).
279. Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 458–61. The plaintiffs below in LULAC argued that the
Elections Clause prohibited mid-decade redistricting rather than partisan gerrymandering in
general. See id.
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2002.280 The most stringent of these newly enacted laws required presentation of a government-issued photo identification as a precondition to voting.281 Although the specific identification requirements varied across states,
the ostensible government justification for them remained constant. State
governments, almost exclusively in Republican-controlled states to start,
claimed voter ID laws were necessary to address the problem of in-person
voter impersonation.282 A person might vote illegally by appearing at the
polling place and cast someone else’s vote by pretending to be them. Requiring a government photo ID would prevent such imposters from doing so
because they would not be able to obtain the necessary matching ID.
Straightforward application of equal protection law raised little constitutional concern about voter ID laws. Though voting is a fundamental constitutional right, the Court has recognized that the states must regulate
elections to ensure order, integrity, and fairness.283 And every element of
election law, “whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself,”
produces some practical restriction on voting.284 If every such voting regulation were subject to strict scrutiny from courts, it would bind the states from
effectively administering its elections. As a consequence, only voting regulations that produce a severe burden on voting draw strict scrutiny and must
be narrowly drawn to advance a compelling state interest.285 “[E]venhanded
restrictions that protect the integrity . . . of the electoral process” and impose a minor burden on voting receive rational basis review from courts and
are generally upheld.286
The Court upheld an Indiana voter ID law under this constitutional
framework in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.287 Voter ID laws are
nondiscriminatory on their face and impose a particular burden on only a
minority of voters who do not have and would encounter particular difficulty in obtaining one. Indeed, the Crawford plaintiffs could not produce a
single Indiana voter to testify that he or she would be ultimately disenfranchised by the ID law. Given that the Court concluded there was only a
limited burden on voters’ rights, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ equal
protection challenge in light of the state’s legitimate interest in protecting
280. See Daniel R. Biggers & Michael J. Hanmer, Understanding the Adoption of Voter
Identification Laws in the American States, 45 Am. Pol. Res. 1, 12–13 (2017) (charting passage
of voter ID laws).
281. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 183, 185–86 (2008) (plurality opinion).
282. See, e.g., id. at 194 (“The only kind of voter fraud that [the Indiana statute at issue]
addresses is in-person voter impersonation at polling places.”).
283. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).
284. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
285. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
286. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 189–90 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n.9).
287. Id. at 204.
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the integrity of its elections from in-person voter fraud.288 Lower courts immediately following Crawford upheld voter ID laws based on the same
reasoning.289
With the spread of voter ID laws across predominantly Republican-controlled states, however, the flimsiness of the claimed government interest
behind the laws became increasingly apparent. The ostensible government
purpose for voter ID laws was the prevention of in-person voter impersonation, but there was virtually no credible evidence that in-person voter impersonation occurs at all. The Crawford Court was willing to overlook the
fact that the state of Indiana could produce no actual cases of in-person
voter impersonation in the state.290 The Court found sufficiently plausible
the risk of in-person voter impersonation that it did not require such evidence, particularly given the deference owed to the state in election administration.291 But through the ongoing political clash over voter ID laws across
the country, it became evident that no one could find many cases of inperson voter impersonation, and certainly nothing that would explain the
rapid popularity of voter ID laws to address a problem that did not seem a
problem. Justin Levitt investigated every specific allegation of voter impersonation between 2000 and 2014 and found a maximum of thirty-one possible incidents across the country, out of more than a billion votes cast, that
might have been prevented by a voter ID requirement.292 Another study of
election fraud cases over the same period found just ten cases of voter impersonation, what it called an “infinitesimal” rate, and an update to the
study, running through 2016 in five states, found no prosecutions for voter
impersonation.293
The limited incidence of voter impersonation is unsurprising because,
as Nate Persily summarizes, “it is an incredibly stupid and inefficient way to
rig an election.”294 Even without any voter ID law, in-person voter impersonation requires identification of registered voters who will not, or are at
least exceedingly unlikely to vote, and then sending imposters to pretend to
288. Id.
289. See, e.g., Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1352–55 (11th Cir. 2009).
290. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 194 (“The record contains no evidence of any such fraud
actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history.”).
291. Id. at 194–95.
292. Justin Levitt, A Comprehensive Investigation of Voter Impersonation Finds 31 Credible
Incidents out of One Billion Ballots Cast, Wash. Post (Aug. 6, 2014), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/08/06/a-comprehensive-investigation-ofvoter-impersonation-finds-31-credible-incidents-out-of-one-billion-ballots-cast/ [https://
perma.cc/M3TT-RFTF].
293. Sami Edge, Review of States with Voter ID Laws Found No Impersonation Fraud, Tex.
Trib. (Aug. 21, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/08/21/review-statesvoter-id-laws-found-no-voter-imperso/ [https://perma.cc/G9QR-HSDU].
294. Michael LaVigne, Comment, Swing State Rulings on Restrictive Voting Laws Highlight
the Need for Comprehensive Election Reform, 85 U. Colo. L. Rev. 505, 529 (2014) (quoting
Nathaniel Persily, Voter ID Cases: Invisible Voter v. Imaginary Fraud, CNN (Aug. 31, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/31/opinion/persily-voter-id-laws/index.html [https://perma.cc/
89XG-3PU5]).
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be those voters one at a time, at personal risk of criminal arrest and prosecution. Each incident depends on the imposter to vote as instructed without
certainty of confirmation and yields only one vote at a time. And yet the
whole effort must be coordinated on a scale that produces enough stolen
votes to swing an election while avoiding detection. By comparison, absentee
ballot fraud or conspiring with election administrators requires fewer participants with greater efficiency.295 Indeed, it is hard to imagine why anyone
interested in stealing an election would opt for in-person voter impersonation over absentee ballot fraud when the latter requires basically the same
elements but permits a single person to complete and send by mail the
whole set of ballots at once. For precisely this reason, other means of voter
fraud appear far more common than in-person voter impersonation.296
The flimsiness of the putative government justifications for voter ID
laws helped lay bare the partisan purpose actually behind them. Because
racial minority and poorer voters are less likely to possess qualifying voter
ID, passage of voter ID laws tends disproportionately to burden voting
among these Democratic-leaning voters.297 As a result, both Republicans and
Democrats understand voter ID laws to favor Republican electoral prospects
and disadvantage Democrats. It is therefore no surprise that voter ID laws
were enacted predominantly by state governments under Republican Party
control and legislatively approved through party-line votes. For instance,
from 2005 to 2007, 95.3 percent of 1,222 Republican legislators who voted
on state voter ID bills, all introduced by fellow Republicans, voted to approve them.298 Just 2.1 percent of 796 Democratic legislators voted likewise.299 Every state that has enacted a strict requirement of a photo ID to
vote has done so under unified Republican legislative control, and in almost

295. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Keynote Address of Prof. Richard L. Hasen Given to The
Voting Wars Symposium, March 23, 2013, 28 J.L. & Pol. 417, 429–30 (2013); LaVigne, supra
note 294.
296. See Hasen, supra note 295, at 430.
297. E.g., Matthew A. Barreto et al., The Disproportionate Impact of Voter-ID Requirements
on the Electorate—New Evidence from Indiana, 42 PS 111, 113–15 (2009); M.V. Hood III &
Charles S. Bullock III, Worth a Thousand Words? An Analysis of Georgia’s Voter Identification
Statute, 36 Am. Pol. Res. 555 (2008). Some instead contend that Democrats will be hurt by
voter ID laws only because ID requirements deter voter fraud, and they claim that Democrats
cheat more. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III & J. Kenneth Blackwell, Holder’s Legacy of Racial Politics,
Wall Street J., Sept. 29, 2014, at A19, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ed-meese-and-j-kennethblackwell-holders-legacy-of-racial-politics-1411945138 (on file with the Michigan Law Review)
(claiming Democrats encourage voter impersonation); Michael Wines, Some Republicans Acknowledge Leveraging Voter ID Laws for Political Gain, N.Y. Times (Sept. 16, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/us/some-republicans-acknowledge-leveraging-voter-id-lawsfor-political-gain.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (citing statements by Republican Representative Glenn Grothman).
298. Robert S. Erikson & Lorraine C. Minnite, Modeling Problems in the Voter Identification—Voter Turnout Debate, 8 Election L.J. 85, 86 (2009).
299. Id.
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every case under Republican gubernatorial control as well.300 One study estimates that the likelihood of a new photo ID law is sixteen times greater
under unified Republican control of state government than any other partisan composition.301 Another study focused on the timing of voter ID laws’
passage finds the partisan takeover of the legislature and governorship in a
state is the best predictor of passage for all categories of voter ID laws and
concludes that “the story behind the adoption of a variety of different voter
ID laws is primarily a partisan one.”302
Republican politicians, staffers, and operatives were surprisingly willing
to publicly admit their expectations that their voter ID laws would help their
party’s electoral prospects. It was not only prominent Republicans like Paul
Weyrich who acknowledged partisan self-interest in suppressing turnout as
overarching political strategy.303 Admissions abounded among Republicans
betraying the partisan motivations specifically behind passage of voter ID
laws and other cutbacks on voting.304 In one of the most publicized examples, Pennsylvania House Republican leader Mike Turzai boasted that the
state’s new voter ID law was “gonna allow [Republican presidential nominee
Mitt] Romney to win the state of Pennsylvania, done.”305 A local Republican
official in North Carolina similarly told the Daily Show that his state’s new
voter ID law was “going to kick the Democrats in the butt.”306 Given these
expectations about the partisan payoff from voter ID laws, it might not be
surprising that, according to a former Republican legislative staffer, Wisconsin state legislators deliberating over new voter ID laws in the Republican
caucus “were giddy about the ramifications and literally singled out the
prospects of suppressing minority and college voters.”307 Giving away the
worst-kept secret in American politics, Republican consultant Scott Tranter
300. Biggers & Hanmer, supra note 280, at 580 (reporting that the twelve states with the
most stringent ID requirement of a photo ID were under Republican legislative control, and all
but one under a Republican governor as well).
301. Rene R. Rocha & Tetsuya Matsubayashi, The Politics of Race and Voter ID Laws in the
State: The Return of Jim Crow?, 67 Pol. Res. Q. 666, 671 (2014); see also William D. Hicks et
al., A Principle or a Strategy? Voter Identification Laws and Partisan Competition in the American States, 68 Pol. Res. Q. 18 (2015) (finding the strength of Republican legislative control
positively and significantly increases likelihood of adopting photo ID requirements, except in
electorally noncompetitive states).
302. Biggers & Hanmer, supra note 280, at 580.
303. Hicks et al., supra note 301, at 19.
304. E.g., Aaron Blake, Republicans Keep Admitting that Voter ID Helps Them Win, for
Some Reason, Wash. Post (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/
2016/04/07/republicans-should-really-stop-admitting-that-voter-id-helps-them-win/ [https://
perma.cc/M77J-G6GG] (collecting examples); David A. Graham, What’s the Goal of Voter-ID
Laws?, Atlantic (May 2, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/jimdemint-voter-id-laws/480876/ [https://perma.cc/WS8B-6F5B] (same); Wines, supra note 297.
305. Mackenzie Weinger, Pa. Pol: Voter ID Helps GOP Win State, Politico (June 25, 2012,
4:26 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2012/06/pa-pol-voter-id-helps-gop-win-state-077811
[https://perma.cc/XG4P-XHLW] (quoting Turzai).
306. Blake, supra note 304 (quoting Don Yelton, then GOP county precinct chair).
307. Wines, supra note 297 (quoting Allbaugh).
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admitted that “we want to do everything we can to help our side. Sometimes
we think that’s voter ID, sometimes we think that’s longer lines.”308
An obstacle to judicial intervention, though, is that constitutional challenges to voting restrictions have traditionally been framed in racial, not
partisan terms. The wealth of equal protection jurisprudence on voting focused on the problem of racial discrimination, often under the Voting Rights
Act, to the neglect of increasingly related questions of partisan discrimination.309 Just so, courts drew on well-established constitutional methodology
in assessing voter ID laws under the Voting Rights Act when challenges were
framed as problems of racial discrimination against African American and
Latino voters.310 Courts, at least initially, balked at challenges to voter ID
laws that seemed framed as questions of partisan discrimination because no
established methodology could readily be pulled off the shelf for the purpose.311 Voter ID requirements were not discriminatory on their face against
Democrats and applied neutrally to all voters, regardless of their disproportionate impact in practical application.312 Nor were Democrats a protected
class for equal protection purposes. Courts had not yet recognized a broad
claim of partisan discrimination, in part because earlier voting restrictions
targeted racial minorities rather than partisan ones. Although both parties
had always fixed voting rules to their advantage to a degree, the recent generation of voting restrictions since Bush v. Gore signaled a new era of intense
partisanship and overweening deployment of election administration for
partisan ends to which constitutional law had not yet adapted.313
By 2012, courts could no longer ignore glaring partisanship in violation
of the usual constitutional expectation of government nondiscrimination,
even in the absence of a readily available doctrinal cubbyhole. Judge Richard
Posner’s abrupt pivot on voter ID laws exemplified this changed approach.
Judge Posner authored the circuit court affirmance upholding Indiana’s

308. John Stephens, Scott Tranter, Republican Consultant: Voter ID and Long Lines Help
Our Side, Huffington Post (Dec. 10, 2012, 8:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
12/10/republican-voter-id-scott-tranter_n_2273927.html [https://perma.cc/9SG6-T2T9].
309. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Race, Redistricting, and Representation, 68 Ohio St. L.J.
1185, 1210–12 (2007).
310. E.g., Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 843 F.3d 592 (4th Cir. 2016); Veasey v. Abbott,
830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017).
311. See, e.g., Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 783 (S.D. Ind. 2006)
(finding that plaintiffs challenging Indiana’s voter ID law were extending a “partisan legislative
disagreement that has spilled out of the state house into the courts” but had “failed to adapt
their arguments to the legal arena”), aff’d sub nom. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472
F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
312. See, e.g., Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D.2012, 2014 WL 184988, at *25
(Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 17, 2014) (explaining that a voter ID law “is facially neutral” because
“[o]f those who lack compliant photo ID, the statute applies to them all equally”).
313. See generally Richard Hasen, The Voting Wars: From Florida 2000 to the Next
Election Meltdown (2012) (surveying this shift); Samuel Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam, 64
Duke L.J. 1363 (2015) (describing the pivot from race to partisanship).

398

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 116:351

voter ID law in Crawford.314 His succinct opinion acknowledged that the
photo ID requirement was more likely to affect Democratic voters but dismissed as minor any burden it imposes.315 Because the burden is minor, and
no suspect class implicated, the ID law needed only to satisfy rational basis
review, for which the deference to the state is overwhelming. Rational basis
did not require any deeper probe into the state’s putative purpose of
preventing voter fraud. However, with the spread of voter ID laws across
Republican states, Judge Posner grew skeptical of voter ID laws and credited
the prescience of the dissenting claim in Crawford that the voter ID law there
was “a not-too-thinly-veiled attempt to discourage election-day turnout by
certain folks believed to skew Democratic.”316 Assessing the Wisconsin voter
ID law in Frank v. Walker, Judge Posner was now convinced of the partisan
purpose behind such laws and therefore unwilling to defer to the state.317
The pattern of Republican adoption of voter ID laws coupled with the fact
that “voter-impersonation fraud is extremely rare” undercut state claims
that these requirements had anything but the partisan purpose of impeding
Democratic turnout.318
Posner’s reversal on voter ID laws signaled a larger, subtle judicial shift
on the issue. States had initially defeated nearly every challenge to voter ID
laws, particularly in the wake of Crawford.319 The tide, however, began to
shift as the partisanship behind these laws became undeniably apparent over
time. Some of these challenges occurred under the Voting Rights Act as racial discrimination claims where plaintiffs had stronger basis for claiming
judicial protection from state antagonism.320 But even non-race-based claims
began to receive surprising judicial sympathy as courts struck down or limited voter ID laws where the usual application of rational basis review
314. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 553 U.S.
181 (2008).
315. Id. at 951–52.
316. Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 784 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc) (quoting Crawford, 472 F.3d at 954 (Evans, J., dissenting)).
317. Id. at 789–95. The district court below found “because virtually no voter impersonation occurs in Wisconsin and it is exceedingly unlikely that voter impersonation will become a
problem in Wisconsin in the foreseeable future, this particular state interest has very little
weight.” Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 847 (E.D. Wis.), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744.
318. Frank, 773 F.3d at 791.
319. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 388, 410 (9th Cir. 2012); Common
Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 2009); Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v.
Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1011 (6th Cir. 2006); Perdue v. Lake, 647 S.E.2d 6, 7–8 (Ga. 2007);
League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 768–69 (Ind. 2010); In re
Request for Advisory Op. Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444, 447–48
(Mich. 2007).
320. See, e.g., Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 843 F.3d 592, 594 (4th Cir. 2016); N.C.
State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.
Ct. 1399 (2017); Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 227 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 612 (2017); Brakebill v. Jaeger, Case No. 1:16-CV-008, 2016 WL 7118548, at *2–3
(D.N.D. Aug. 1, 2016); South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30, 32 (D.D.C. 2012);
Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 117 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated mem., 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013).
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seemed to require deference to the state. In addition to several decisions
limiting voter ID laws under the Voting Rights Act in South Carolina321 and
Texas,322 courts in Arkansas,323 North Dakota,324 Pennsylvania,325 and Tennessee326 either struck down or modified state voter ID laws to minimize their
burden on voters. In other words, as Rick Hasen concludes, “it appeared that
in the most egregious cases of partisan overreach, courts were serving, often
with surprising unanimity, as a judicial backstop.”327 Judicial decisions were
far from uniformly sympathetic to these constitutional challenges, but even
in the absence of obvious doctrinal direction, courts appeared surprisingly
willing to limit intended partisan payoffs, particularly when states imposed
new restrictions in a rush before the 2012 elections.
Courts acted along similar lines to limit state cutbacks on early voting.
Again, Republicans believed that restricting in-person early voting would
limit Democratic turnout and help their electoral chances. For instance, top
Florida Republicans, including former Republican governor Charlie Crist
and former Republican Party chairman Jim Greer, among others, admitted
that reductions to the early voting period in the state were motivated by
partisan self-interest, rather than the claimed prevention of voter fraud.328 As
Greer put it, the antifraud rationale for these cutbacks was a thin pretext,
“all a marketing ploy,” because the Republican legislature cut back early voting “for one reason and one reason only”—“early voting is bad for Republican Party candidates.”329 Although evidence of voter fraud from early voting
was just as vacuous as evidence of voter impersonation, Republican governments curtailed early voting and restricted voting through other administrative means in several battleground states leading up to the 2012 elections,
including Florida and Ohio.
One particular 2012 Ohio case, decided just weeks before that year’s
presidential election, illustrated how courts began responding to the obvious
partisanship of this sort of election lawmaking. Obama for America v. Husted
addressed a constitutional challenge to cutbacks on early voting in Ohio in
321. South Carolina, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 53–54 (Bates, J., concurring).
322. See supra note 320.
323. Martin v. Kohls, 444 S.W.3d 844, 852–53 (Ark. 2014).
324. Brakebill, 2016 WL 7118548, at *2–3.
325. Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1, 3–5 (Pa. 2012) (per curiam); see also Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D.2012, 2014 WL 184988, at *60 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
Jan. 27, 2014).
326. City of Memphis v. Hargett, No. M2012–02141–COA–R3–CV, 2012 WL 5265006, at
*1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2012).
327. Hasen, supra note 18, at 1868.
328. Dara Kam, Former Florida GOP Leaders Say Voter Suppression Was Reason They
Pushed New Election Law, Palm Beach Post (Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/
news/state--regional-govt--politics/former-florida-gop-leaders-say-voter-suppression-was-rea
son-they-pushed-new-election-law/R9iQlcYqCBY3k1u4k5XdLP/ [https://perma.cc/C6LQLEDS].
329. Id. (quoting Greer).
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advance of the 2012 elections.330 For six years until these cutbacks, all Ohio
voters could vote early in person during the three days immediately before
election day.331 An estimated 93,000 Ohioans had voted early during these
three days in the previous presidential election, and these voters tended to
vote Democratic, boosted by the “souls to the polls” mobilization of African
American churchgoers on Sunday.332 Not coincidentally, leading up to the
2012 elections, the Republican legislature hurried through legislative changes
that abolished early voting during the critical final weekend for 2012.333 Furthermore, these enactments ended early voting for most Ohioans, but the
legislature left open early voting during these three days only for military
voters, who voted disproportionately Republican.334 This reduction in early
voting for voters who favored Democrats, while exempting voters who favored Republicans, resulted from what Ned Foley called a “convoluted series
of legislative enactments”335 with minimal legislative deliberation or government rationale beyond rote recitations about administrative burdens and
cost saving.336
The problem for any constitutional challenge here was the absence of an
underlying right to early voting in the first place. The state of Ohio was
under no constitutional obligation to offer early voting at all, let alone specifically during the three days preceding the election. In fact, Ohio still allowed twenty-three days of early voting, more than the average among
thirty-two states that permitted early voting at all.337 The lawsuit was therefore a “Hail Mary” pass for Democrats bringing the challenge and the subject of a famous wager among Democratic campaign lawyers as a longshot
proposition.338 The constitutional problem in Husted was not the early voting reduction by itself, but instead the government’s differential treatment of
Democratic- and Republican-leaning voters in the absence of serious government justification, particularly in the run-up to a presidential election.339
330. 888 F. Supp. 2d 897, 902 (S.D. Ohio), aff’d, 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012).
331. Obama for Am., 888 F. Supp. 2d at 902.
332. See id. at 902–03; see also Hasen, supra note 18, at 1879–80.
333. See Steven F. Heufner, Lessons from Improvements in Military and Overseas Voting, 47
U. Rich. L. Rev. 833, 858–62 (2013).
334. See Michael J. Pitts, Defining “Partisan” Law Enforcement, 18 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev.
324, 337 (2007) (explaining that expansion of military voting helps Republicans).
335. Edward B. Foley, Non-Retrogression, Equal Protection, and Ohio’s Early Voting Case,
ElectionLaw@Moritz (Sept. 6, 2012, 10:59 AM), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/election-law/arti
cle/?article=9673 [https://perma.cc/5UKA-FMC5].
336. See id.; see also Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 432–33 (6th Cir. 2012)
(noting “the financial hardship that early voting might cause” to the state and the counties);
Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 548 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting
that, in Obama for America, the state asserted an “interest in reducing costs and administrative
burdens”), vacated, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014).
337. See Hasen, supra note 18, at 1868.
338. See id. at 1879–81.
339. Cf. Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 435 (“[T]he State has offered no justification for not
providing similarly situated voters those same opportunities.”).
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The district court surprisingly enjoined the cutback and explained that its
basis was not a broader right to early voting but instead a determination
against arbitrary discrimination among voters.340 In a further upset, the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court and cautioned against the risks “if
states were permitted to pick and choose among groups of similarly situated
voters to dole out special voting privileges.”341 Indeed, describing the present
case without being so explicit, the court warned that without a judicial
check, “[p]artisan state legislatures could give extra early voting time to
groups that traditionally support the party in power and impose corresponding burdens on the other party’s core constituents.”342 For this reason,
the court insisted on greater scrutiny than usually applied under rational
basis to the asserted injury and the precise interests proffered by the state.343
The best way to understand Husted and other cases similarly limiting
partisan overreach is enforcement of a basic, implicit constitutional norm
against government partisanship. Even in the absence of firm doctrinal direction, courts instinctively reacted to the wrongfulness of incumbents serving, in these cases, the undeniably partisan purpose of entrenching
themselves.344 It is important not to overclaim and still acknowledge that
courts have not invented wholesale new prohibitions on election rules that
differentially impact partisans. In a familiar analysis described earlier, the
mere presence of partisan motivations would not per se invalidate laws with
partisan results provided the laws could be justified by coinciding legitimate
government interests.345 As a result, judicial intervention in these cases has
been uneven and sometimes overturned later on. Still, one remarkable consistency is that partisanship standing alone, with other potential government
interests stripped away as inapplicable, cannot qualify as an adequate constitutional basis for upholding such laws even under rational basis, especially
the heightened rational basis applied by the Sixth Circuit. The transparent
weakness of the claimed antifraud justifications for voter ID laws and the
claimed cost savings from early voting reductions laid bare the raw partisanship motivating these laws. Cases like Husted demonstrate judicial willingness to enforce an overarching constitutional norm of government
nonpartisanship, even in the absence of clear textual basis, when confronted
with patently partisan attempts to jury-rig election results.
340. Obama for Am. v. Husted, 888 F. Supp. 2d 897, 910 (S.D. Ohio), aff’d, 697 F.3d 423.
341. Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 435.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 431.
344. See Issacharoff, supra note 17, at 311 (explaining that the Ohio early voting cutbacks
“smacked of misuse of state authority to attempt to alter election outcomes”); see also Janai S.
Nelson, The First Amendment, Equal Protection and Felon Disenfranchisement: A New Viewpoint, 65 Fla. L. Rev. 111 (2013) (analyzing felon disenfranchisement in similar terms);
Daniel P. Tokaji, Voting Is Association, 43 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 763 (2016) (characterizing new
voting restrictions in partisan terms and arguing for judicial attention to the partisan impact
of such laws).
345. See, e.g., Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 2016) (upholding
cutbacks in early voting without differentiation between military and civilian voters).
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For this principle, the Husted courts cited back to Bush v. Gore.346 If
Bush v. Gore stands for anything, it prohibits differential standards for recounting ballots based on a fear that government actors might tailor ad hoc
standards to advance their party’s candidates. The Court in Bush v. Gore was
careful to cabin this principle to the very specific context of “a state court
with the power to assure uniformity has ordered a statewide recount with
minimal procedural safeguards.”347 The Court did not want to impose a
constitutional requirement of uniform election procedures across localities
as a general matter. Still, it saw special need for uniformity in a post-election
recount where election administrators could purposefully swing the close
election’s outcome by choosing counting standards more favorable to their
preferred candidate. In other words, Bush v. Gore identified and enforced a
similar constitutional expectation, as the Husted court explained, that “the
State may not by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s
vote over that of another.”348
In an important sense, Justice Stevens’s opinion in Crawford anticipated
this principle. Although Justice Stevens voted in Crawford to uphold Indiana’s voter ID law, he also held open the opportunity for as-applied challenges and addressed the problem of partisan motivations. The plaintiffs had
pointed out that the state had passed its voter ID law on a party-line vote,
and even Justice Stevens agreed that “partisan considerations may have
played a significant role.”349 But this was early in the wave of voter ID laws to
come, and Justice Stevens could not rule out the legitimacy of antifraud
interests in justifying the law as confidently as later courts.350 In a mixed
motive case where “a nondiscriminatory law is supported by valid neutral
justifications, those justifications should not be disregarded simply because
partisan interests may have provided one motivation for the votes of individual legislators.”351 Justice Stevens noted cautiously that “[i]f such [partisan] considerations had provided the only justification for a photo
identification requirement, we may also assume that SEA 483 would suffer
the same fate as the poll tax at issue in Harper.”352 That is, the presence of
partisanship in the legislative motivation was not grounds by itself for invalidation, but partisan considerations could not serve as the state purpose and
justification for the law either.
346. See Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 428 (citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000)
(per curiam)); Obama for Am. v. Husted, 888 F. Supp. 2d 897, 905, 907, 910 (S.D. Ohio)
(citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000) (per curiam)), aff’d, 697 F.3d 423.
347. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam).
348. Obama for Am., 888 F. Supp. 2d at 910 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bush, 531 U.S.
at 104–05).
349. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 203 (2008) (plurality opinion).
350. See, e.g., Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D.2012, 2014 WL 184988, at *20
(Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 17, 2014) (finding the state “wholly failed to show any evidence of inperson voter fraud” and refusing to find “in-person voter fraud a compelling interest the Voter
ID Law was designed to serve”).
351. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204.
352. Id. at 203.
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III. The Constitutional Norm Against Partisan Gerrymandering
The norm against government partisanship is more the rule than the
exception across the law of democracy. Official nondiscrimination follows
naturally from the overarching premises of the First Amendment, equal protection, and democratic government. The puzzle therefore is why the Court
in Vieth diverged from this natural expectation of nonpartisanship in the
judicial oversight of legislative redistricting where the need for government
nonpartisanship is most acute and so rarely met.353 Courts and commentators have been convinced by Justice Scalia’s declarations354 that partisanship
“is a traditional criterion, and a constitutional one” in redistricting provided
it does not “go too far.”355 This faith, widely accepted after Vieth, clashes
with so many elements of constitutional law that courts have since struggled
to coherently patch together a consistent approach to government partisanship at a time when hyperpolarized partisanship threatens the law of democracy more saliently than at any point during our lifetime. Explicit
consolidation of this approach under a constitutional rule against government partisan purpose would bring new coherence to the judicial approach
to partisan gerrymandering and spill off similar benefits across election law
at a time it is most urgently needed.
A. A Way Forward Against Partisan Gerrymandering
In reconsidering partisan gerrymandering, the Court should clearly assert the norm against government partisanship described here from First
Amendment law, to one person, one vote, to election administration. In all
the areas of law described above, the crux of the harm is the government’s
partisan purpose, not the magnitude of partisan effect.356 The problem with
a government advertisement endorsing one party over the other is not simply that the government endorsement will be effective in swinging an election. An advertisement’s effectiveness is almost totally irrelevant to the
constitutional question of viewpoint discrimination. The core harm is the
government’s clear partisan purpose to bias the election, whether or not the
attempt is effective. For the same reason, courts striking down partisan gerrymanders for violating one person, one vote focus on the partisanship of
the government’s purpose and legislative process. They do not measure the
harm in those cases by the magnitude of the partisan effect, or even the
magnitude of the population deviation.
Just so for redistricting, there is no obvious sense in permitting a nontrivial measure of partisan favoritism or animus as the basis for lawmaking,
353. Cf. Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 629 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (Cogburn, J.,
concurring) (“While redistricting to protect the party that controls the state legislature is constitutionally permitted and lawful, it is in disharmony with fundamental values upon which
this country was founded.”), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
354. See supra Section I.A.
355. Cox v. Larios, 524 U.S. 947, 952 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
356. See supra Part II.
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as Justice Scalia would have it, but drawing the constitutional line at some
further extreme amount. Any difference is only in degree, not in kind, at
least as far as the Court has been able to articulate. And the degree of harm
from significant gerrymanders, like those still upheld in Bandemer and
Vieth,357 are paradigmatic examples of partisan gerrymandering that no one
denies are obvious attempts by the government to extend majority party
advantage. More extreme examples of gerrymandering are hard to imagine,
as the case law following Bandemer documents.358 So, if any partisan gerrymander is unconstitutional, it must be these classic instances of the species.
Understanding that the core harm from partisan gerrymandering is this
violation of government nonpartisanship illuminates the best approach for
courts to identifying unconstitutionality in this context. First, the constitutionality of a redistricting depends not necessarily on extreme partisan
asymmetry in terms of political results but on the exclusivity of the government’s partisan purpose underlying the redistricting. Courts already investigate partisan purpose under virtually every approach to partisan
gerrymandering, so this type of judicial inquiry into partisan purpose is already well established and far from new.359 What is newly proposed here is
that the constitutionality of a redistricting no longer hinge upon the extremeness of its practical effects. A more extreme partisan gerrymander is
not more unconstitutional than a less extreme one because it goes further,
or even because it goes too far at all. Instead, the degree to which the government acts to serve wholly partisan purposes rather than legitimate state
interests in redistricting, determines the constitutional wrongfulness in violation of the usual norm. Partisan purpose can be established through direct
evidence or through indirect demonstration that the redistricting’s partisan
effect cannot be explained except with reference to purpose to advantage the
majority party over others.
The precise articulation of the judicial analysis for identifying the requisite partisan purpose is less important than this basic substantive re-orientation of the inquiry. However, in considering a “second-order” challenge to
partisan redistricting under one person, one vote, the Supreme Court reasoned that the plaintiffs needed to show that “it was more probable than not
that the use of illegitimate factors significantly explained deviations from
numerical equality.”360 Courts could readily adapt this articulation from
“second-order” review of partisan gerrymandering under one person, one
vote, to first-order review of partisan gerrymandering by requiring plaintiffs

357. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004) (plurality opinion); Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986) (plurality opinion).
358. See supra Part I.
359. See Fallon, supra note 13, at 534; supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also Brief
of the ACLU et al. as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Appellees at 28–31, Gill v. Whitford, No.
16-1161 (U.S. Sept. 1, 2017) (proposing a burden-shifting approach to partisan intent based
on the pattern-or-practice cases under civil rights laws).
360. Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1310 (2016).
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to show it more probable than not that partisan purpose significantly explains a redistricting’s partisan characteristics to the exclusion of legitimate
state interests under rational basis. Doing so would unify both equal protection approaches to gerrymandering under the same standard and reasoning.
The exclusivity of the government’s partisan purposes, not the extremeness
of partisan bias in election outcomes, would be the critical consideration.
Courts evaluating partisan gerrymandering under a parallel state provision
of equal protection, or alternatively the right to vote or the First Amendment, could conceivably adopt a similar approach and standard.
Viewed in this light, LULAC v. Perry361 was an underestimated moment
in the law of gerrymandering. Although it is easy to remember LULAC as a
simple reaffirmation of Vieth, LULAC presented a clearer case of essential
partisan purpose than Vieth. LULAC featured a mid-decade redistricting, a
rare re-redistricting, where the state of Texas had no constitutional obligation under one person, one vote to redistrict, and the district court had
found “little question but that the single-minded purpose of the Texas Legislature . . . was to gain partisan advantage.”362 The circumstances of the reredistricting made unusually clear the government’s partisanship, bolstered
by testimony from state legislators and procedural irregularities aimed at
ramming the re-redistricting through the legislature.363 In other words, LULAC offered the Court particularly powerful direct evidence of the government’s partisan purpose, as Justices Stevens and Breyer emphasized in their
opinions. In nonetheless dismissing the constitutional challenge, Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in LULAC did not quite discount the centrality
of partisan purpose, but insisted that “partisan aims did not guide every line
[the legislature] drew,” and returned to the question of a judicial standard
for measuring the representational harm.364 LULAC, with exceptional direct
evidence of partisanship, was thus a lost opportunity to focus courts on
partisan purpose and square redistricting with the rest of constitutional law.
Second, courts should focus on the extremeness of a redistricting’s partisan effects primarily as a proxy for partisan purpose, rather than a measure
of the substantive harm itself. Again, there is no magical threshold for partisan bias from gerrymandering above which it presents a substantive harm,
but below which it does not. It is hard even to imagine a theory under which
only extreme partisan bias is constitutionally wrongful, but a lesser and still
significant amount is not. Cases like LULAC with overwhelming direct evidence of partisan purpose therefore do not require significant inquiry into
the extremeness of the redistricting’s partisan effects. In these cases, the requisite partisan purpose of the state is manifest from the peculiarities of the
361. 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
362. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 417 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (quoting Session v. Perry, 298 F.
Supp. 2d 451, 470 (E.D. Tex.), vacated sub nom. Jackson v. Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004)); see also
People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1231–32 (Colo. 2003) (striking down a congressional re-redistricting under state law as against public policy).
363. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 458 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
364. Id. at 417 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
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legislative process and testimony from those involved in it. With partisan
purpose established, there is no need to assess the extremeness of partisan
effects because it serves merely as an indirect method for establishing purpose where direct evidence is less clear.
The magnitude of partisan bias resulting from a gerrymander is therefore only a prudential consideration. Courts ought to measure the extremeness of partisan bias when direct evidence is less than overwhelming,
because it serves as indirect but reliable evidence of the real constitutional
focus, the government’s overriding partisan purpose. In cases where purpose
is less clear, expert testimony regarding the expected partisan bias of the
plan can show that the bias is so extreme that it is overwhelmingly likely the
result of purposeful government efforts to prioritize partisan advantage over
other legitimate state interests. An example from the one person, one vote
cases is the Fourth Circuit case Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass’n v. Wake County
Board of Elections.365 An expert political scientist’s study of the redistricting
there led him to testify “with extremely high statistical certainty, beyond any
sort of doubt,” given the partisan bias of the redistricting, that it was the
product of partisanship.366 The Fourth Circuit clarified that the study was
not legally required as a means of establishing a requisite level of extremeness, but instead that it helped “demonstrate what might explain the population deviations in the enacted plan” and thus expose alternate state
explanations as pretextual.367 The magnitude of partisan bias evidences partisan purpose because it becomes impossible for the government to explain
the redistricting in terms of legitimate state interests, as opposed to raw partisanship, when the partisan bias is so extreme.
As a consequence, any judicial standard for measuring the partisan effects of a gerrymander should be directed toward demonstrating the government’s essential partisan purpose. Proposed measures of partisan effects
should be understood as ways of evidencing how the redistricting is the result of purpose to advantage the majority party to the exclusion of other
redistricting criteria. For instance, Ned Foley argues that representational
distortion from a challenged gerrymander ought to be compared to the
same measure for the original gerrymander of an 1812 Massachusetts legislative district, named after Elbridge Gerry.368 Using the standard of the original gerrymander as a measuring stick for the constitutional violation makes
sense, Foley argues, because the original gerrymander embodies the archetypal violation of fair play for which the practice of gerrymandering is now
known.369 But Foley assumes that the substantive problem with a gerrymander is the representational distortion itself, which is constitutionally cognizable only beyond a certain objective threshold just as Justice Scalia argues.
365. 827 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2016).
366. Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass’n, 827 F.3d at 344.
367. Id.
368. Foley, supra note 95, at 711, 720–21.
369. Id. at 720–21.
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Although the representational distortion may track important representational harms flowing from the gerrymander, the crux of the constitutional
inquiry instead ought to remain focused on the centrality of the government’s partisan purpose. A measure of extreme representational distortion is
probative by indirectly showing, in combination with available direct evidence, that extreme bias did not occur incidentally from the government’s
pursuit of legitimate redistricting criteria. It was instead a purposeful result
entirely of government’s effort to expand its partisan advantage.
This approach obviates the need to establish an objective baseline for
measuring representational harm. To judge when a gerrymander goes “too
far” in terms of partisan bias, the argument has always been that one needs
an objective expectation of fair representation to measure the representation
harm as distortion from this baseline expectation. This conundrum of political theory was Justice Scalia’s bone of contention in Vieth, and the source of
Justice Kennedy’s inaction in Vieth and LULAC. But if legitimate state interest and partisan purpose are the focus, then precise measurement of representational harm is no longer central to the claim. Instead, the inquiry shifts
to which government purposes are responsible for whatever partisan bias
stands in question, large or small. If direct evidence substantiates government partisanship as the answer, then the partisan gerrymander may be unconstitutional even if the magnitude of partisan bias is not extreme.
Conversely, if the government can explain the resulting partisan bias as a
byproduct of legitimate, nondiscriminatory state interests in redistricting,
such as district compactness, compliance with one person, one vote, or respect for political subdivisions, then the government may successfully defend the gerrymander. For instance, political scientists Jowei Chen and
Jonathan Rodden’s use of computer simulations estimate the likelihood that
a redistricting’s partisan bias is the result simply of geographic contiguity,
compactness, and population equality without reference to party and race.370
Bruce Cain, Emily Zhang, Yan Liu, and Wendy Tam Cho offer a more robust
supercomputing solution that can demonstrate the ease of drawing a compliant plan without similar levels of partisan bias.371 When combined with
other evidence, their results offer a rough baseline for judging whether a
redistricting’s actual bias could have resulted only from the additional purpose of advancing the majority party’s interests.372
370. Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Cutting Through the Thicket: Redistricting Simulations and the Detection of Partisan Gerrymanders, 14 Election L.J. 331 (2015); Chen & Rodden, supra note 37.
371. Bruce E. Cain et al., A Reasonable Bias Approach to Gerrymandering: Using Automated
Plan Generation to Evaluate Redistricting Proposals, 59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (forthcoming Apr.
2018) (on file with the Michigan Law Review); see also Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Tests for
Practical Evaluation of Partisan Gerrymandering, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 1263 (2016).
372. Such results, of course, offer only a rough baseline unless the simulations also incorporate applicable state and federal legal requirements, including the Voting Rights Act, in
addition to contiguity, compactness, and equipopulosity. See Wang, supra note 371, at
1306–16.
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One potential criticism is that this approach to partisan gerrymandering
does not go far enough. For instance, this approach allows for the possibility
of a partisan gerrymander with objectively large partisan bias that is not
constitutionally actionable if the government can persuasively answer that
partisan bias occurred coincidentally in the government’s pursuit of other
legitimate political interests. As Justice Breyer explained in Vieth, “The use of
purely political boundary-drawing factors, even where harmful to the members of one party, will often nonetheless find justification in other desirable
democratic ends.”373 None of the justices, including Justice Stevens, had any
interest in excising all trace of partisanship from the redistricting process
where the results can be plausibly understood as directed toward some legitimate, public-spirited ends.374 The worry was less about removing all underlying partisan motivation and effect from the process than permitting it only
when incidental to the state’s pursuit of legitimate political objectives
through the process. The constitutional requirement is not a politically fair
division of partisan representation.375 The requirement is simply that the
government have “an acceptable rational basis [that is] neither purely personal nor purely partisan.”376 This requirement thus indirectly serves as a
prudential limitation on judicial intervention. If most gerrymanders are not
so severe, nor so motivated by partisanship, that other interests significantly
account for their resulting partisan bias, then only the most severe and clearest cases of partisan gerrymandering will be found unconstitutional.377
However, the requirement of legitimate purpose beyond partisanship
still substantively restrains the excesses of gerrymandering because pretextual justifications go only so far. Justice Scalia overstates the case when he
argues that “there always is a neutral explanation” for a gerrymander.378
Courts already scrutinize government justifications for redistricting decisions according to established methodology honed by years of judicial practice. For example, in Larios v. Cox, the district court closely examined and
rejected the state’s claims that its gerrymander was justified by its interests in
373. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 360 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
374. See, e.g., id. at 335 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
375. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 130 (1986) (“Our cases, however, clearly
foreclose any claim that the Constitution requires proportional representation or that legislatures in reapportioning must draw district lines to come as near as possible to allocating seats
to the contending parties in proportion to what their anticipated statewide vote will be.”).
376. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 337–38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
377. Chris Elmendorf astutely observes that an intent-based focus may shift unmanageability from an inquiry into effects to one about intent. See Christopher Elmendorf,
From Educational Adequacy to Representational Adequacy: A New Template for Legal Attacks on
Partisan Gerrymanders, 59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (forthcoming Apr. 2018) (on file with the
Michigan Law Review). An intent-based focus, however, places conceptual focus in the right
place, on government partisanship, which is a valuable move. Elmendorf himself offers a
framework for identifying relevant state interests and measuring them against a redistricting
plan that would helpful in an intent-based inquiry and mitigate any unmanageability. Id.
378. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 300 (plurality opinion).
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incumbent protection and preserving existing districts.379 The court observed that the state had pursued these interests inconsistently, to the exclusive advantage of only one party, and therefore dismissed the state
justifications as pretextual.380 Likewise in Whitford, the district court considered whether the gerrymander there could “be justified by the legitimate
state concerns and neutral factors that traditionally bear on the reapportionment process.”381 The court dismissed the state’s claims that the gerrymander could be justified in terms of legitimate state interests, as well as
Wisconsin’s political geography, because the plaintiffs demonstrated no
shortage of alternative maps that served those interests equally well without
comparable partisan bias.382 Indeed, the plaintiffs showed that the state itself
considered many alternative maps that did the same with less partisan bias,
but deliberately rejected them because, as the district court saw it, the state’s
purpose was precisely to exaggerate the partisan advantage, its contrary
claims notwithstanding.383
Of course, state actors would obscure their partisanship to minimize
direct evidence of impermissible purpose. If and when they do so successfully, partisan gerrymandering cases will again return largely to an analysis
of partisan effects. Why is this approach still better even then? If courts focus
on partisan effects in the absence of direct evidence, courts will know clearly
why they are doing so and what they need to find for the plaintiffs to win—
partisan purpose to the exclusion of other legitimate government interests as
justification. And there is no need at all to engage the intractable inquiry
into the normative baseline of what constitutes fair representation from
which to measure representational harm. This question has bedeviled courts
and commentators since Vieth, and it becomes a moot point when courts
focus on partisan purpose, not representational harm.
An alternate criticism is that a purpose-centered approach actually goes
too far by requiring courts to engage in the quagmire of discerning legislative purpose. After all, the Shaw v. Reno cases demonstrated the challenges of
sorting out the complex legislative politics intrinsic to redistricting.384 But
there are at least two important responses. First, courts already inquire into
legislative intent and purpose under current redistricting law. Bandemer required plaintiffs to show “intentional discrimination against an identifiable
379. Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1347–51 (N.D. Ga.), aff’d mem., 542 U.S. 947
(2004). For a recent example of successful, albeit partial, defense by the government, see Perez
v. Abbott, SA–11–CV–360, 2017 WL 1450121, at *45–74 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2017), where the
court conducted the same inquiry and found that plaintiffs failed to prove certain districts at
variance from one person, one vote were the result of partisan purpose or other illegitimate
reapportionment factors.
380. Id.
381. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 912 (W.D. Wis. 2016), prob. juris. postponed to
hearing on the merits, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017).
382. Id. at 891–96, 922–27.
383. Id. at 891–96.
384. See generally Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 Yale L.J. 2505 (1997).
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political group,”385 and subsequently in Whitford, the district court likewise
required partisan intent or purpose and concluded from direct evidence adduced at trial that the partisan bias of the gerrymander resulted from the
legislature’s partisan purpose.386 Along the same lines, every justice’s proposed approach in Vieth similarly required proof of partisan intent for unconstitutionality. The major modification proposed here is not that courts
newly engage legislative purpose, but instead that when they do already, a
finding of partisan purpose can be sufficient for unconstitutionality, in the
absence of other legitimate government interests, without the additional
showing of excessiveness as to partisan effects.
Second, judicial inquiry into legislative purpose is different from inquiry
into legislative motivation.387 Redistricting is rife with individual legislators
with partisan motivations. It is certainly difficult to weigh the importance of
individual partisan motivations against the welter of other competing considerations fighting for influence in the complex process. Legislative purpose
may be informed by evidence of partisan motivation, but a finding of purpose in this context is more generally aimed at the imputation of an objective legislative aim necessary to make intelligible the legislative adoption of a
particular redistricting.388 Inquiry into partisan purpose here thus does not
require a free-ranging hunt for partisan intent anywhere in the process for
every case, but instead arises in this context mainly in two situations: (i)
when the government cannot explain an alternative, legitimate basis for resulting partisan discrimination, but partisan purpose offers the strongest account; and (ii) when the government declines even to try an alternative
explanation and admits its partisan purpose. The latter case of government
admission, in particular, occurs more regularly than one might intuit, often
as an absurd but popular defense in racial gerrymandering cases that I discuss in greater detail the next Section.389 Governments confess partisan purpose when they believe that it will be too difficult to establish excessive
partisan effect under Vieth and therefore explain gerrymandering of racial
minority voters in partisan terms to deflect allegations of racially discriminatory intent.390
385. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986) (plurality opinion).
386. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884–98; see also Ringhand, supra note 186 (surveying
judicial inquiry into partisan purpose across various areas of First Amendment law).
387. Justin Levitt would go further and invalidate redistricting based on invidious partisan
intent. Levitt, supra note 14 (manuscript at 16–17). Richard Briffault similarly proposes unconstitutionality when the redistricting is “tainted by excessive pursuit of legislative personal
or partisan self-interest.” Richard Briffault, Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan
Gerrymandering, 14 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 397, 418 (2005).
388. See Fallon, supra note 13, at 543 (describing legislative purpose or intent, in contrast
to subjective legislative motivation, as “predicated on what an imagined typical legislature,
enacting particular statutory language in a specified historical context, would most reasonably
be understood as having aimed at or having been motivated by”).
389. See infra notes 424–435 and accompanying text.
390. See infra notes 317–327 and accompanying text.

December 2017]

The Constitutional Norm Against Government Partisanship

411

As a consequence, a prohibition on partisan purpose as constitutional
justification not only eliminates this perverse defense but actually simplifies
judicial inquiry into legislative purpose in many redistricting cases. The
greatest conundrum in the Shaw cases was parsing apart racial and partisan
legislative motivations because racial and partisan classifications are so
highly correlated and bound up in American politics.391 This judicial conundrum disappears when neither racial nor partisan purpose suffices as constitutional justification, and courts thus no longer need to distinguish between
them.
B. Substantive Payoffs Beyond Gerrymandering:
The Challenge of Hyperpolarization
Beyond partisan gerrymandering, the notion that partisanship can serve
as a basis for lawmaking creates precedential incoherence for courts trying to
cabin the new hyperpolarization of contemporary American politics. There
are constitutional prohibitions on government partisanship in patronage
hiring, election-related advocacy, and regulating the election ballot. There is
a second-order prohibition on partisanship even in redistricting under the
one person, one vote rule. The oddity is that the Court has been equivocal
regarding first-order prohibitions on partisanship in redistricting since
Vieth’s dictum that partisanship is an “ordinary and lawful [government]
motive.”392 This equivocation has befuddled lower-court judges confronted
with the increasingly pervasive partisanship of today’s politics.393 Vieth and
its progeny, in their ambivalence about partisanship, are the prominent outlier from the broader constitutional norm and therefore impede a coherent
judicial approach toward modern hyperpartisanship. A clear prohibition on
necessary reliance on partisanship as a basis for redistricting would unify
constitutional law in the specific area where partisanship is most prominent
and obvious today.
A straightforward judicial expectation of government nonpartisanship
as a basis for lawmaking should have a salutary “laundering” effect on lawmaking preferences. Courts acknowledge, as Robert Dixon once put it, that
“all districting is ‘gerrymandering’ ” because legislators always seek to advance their reelection and party interests.394 Even if legislator preferences in
391. See Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican
Efforts to Make It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 Harv. L. Rev. F. 58,
70–71 (2014), https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/forvol127_hasen.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X7W8-DQLV].
392. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 286 (2004) (plurality opinion).
393. See, e.g., Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 629 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (Cogburn, J.,
concurring) (“While redistricting to protect the party that controls the state legislature is constitutionally permitted and lawful, it is in disharmony with fundamental values upon which
this country was founded.”), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
394. Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Democratic Representation: Reapportionment in Law
and Politics 462 (1968); see, e.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 289; In re Senate Joint Resolution of
Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 643 (Fla. 2012).
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redistricting are always influenced by partisanship, however, courts might
launder these preferences by refusing to credit them as legitimate justifications in redistricting under rational basis.395 Whatever the legislators’ actual
motivations for their redistricting choices, courts can filter out partisan justifications as arbitrary considerations and force legislators to justify their
choices only in public-regarding terms courts are willing to credit. In this
way, a nonpartisanship norm suppresses explicit partisanship in the redistricting process and channels the government in public-regarding directions
where its choices are more legally defensible.
Overt partisanship in the redistricting process should decrease because
lawmakers would rightfully worry that overt partisanship raises judicial suspicions and reduces the likelihood their redistricting will be upheld. Such a
reduction in “partisan talk” would be healthy in modern redistricting where
lawmakers openly threaten to “cannibalize” the minority party396 and readily
agree that redistricting is “the business of rigging elections.”397 Just as importantly, this laundering substantively limits gerrymandering to the extent
that the requirement of public-regarding justification limits the achievable
magnitude of partisan bias. And, of course, there is always some additional
possibility that legislators might actually internalize the nonpartisanship
norm to a degree and launder their internal thinking in the face of judicial
stigmatization. Rick Pildes has argued, regarding the law of racial gerrymandering, that legislators progressively internalized “a sense of constraint from
Shaw,” thereby minimizing the need for actual litigation and judicial enforcement, and suggests legislators might do the same with an anti-partisanship norm.398
The need for judicial assertion of a clear constitutional norm of nonpartisanship is acutely important in today’s “hyperpolarized” politics.399 The
Supreme Court’s entry into the political thicket in Baker v. Carr400 occurred
during a historical era of rare bipartisanship in American politics from the
1950s into the early 1960s. As Henry Brady and Hahrie Han document, the
post–World War II era featured nearly unprecedented blurring of partisan
lines in Congress and among voters, with unusual levels of ideological overlap across the major parties.401 For instance, as measured in 1963, the year
395. See Robert Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in Foundations of Social Choice Theory 75, 75–77 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986).
396. Hulme v. Madison County, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1051 (S.D. Ill. 2001).
397. John Hoeffel, Six Incumbents Are a Week Away from Easy Election, Winston-Salem
J., Jan. 27, 1998, at B1 (quoting state senator Mark McDaniel criticizing the North Carolina
legislature).
398. See Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 Harv. L.
Rev. 29, 68–70 (2004); see also Briffault, supra note 387, at 419 (agreeing that Shaw v. Reno
proved “surprisingly manageable” because “the political process absorbed Shaw’s prohibition
against excessive attention to race”).
399. See generally Pildes, supra note 22 (explaining hyperpolarization).
400. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
401. Hahrie Han & Henry W. Brady, A Delayed Return to Historical Norms: Congressional
Party Polarization After the Second World War, 37 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 505, 512–16 (2007).
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after Baker v. Carr, roughly half of House Democrats were more conservative than the most liberal House Republicans.402 Party loyalties of the time
were cross-pressured by race and bipartisan consensus over the Cold War,
and the parties were ideologically heterogeneous, each featuring conservative
and liberal wings from different regional bases. Even the Court’s doctrinal
point of entry into the political thicket—one person, one vote—largely pitted intrastate regional interests against each other, urban versus rural, with
little national party valence at the time.403 Instead, the most salient political
divisions confronted by courts during the era were racial, not partisan. Liberals in both major parties joined forces to enact the Voting Rights Act of
1965 over conservative Dixiecrat resistance from a one-party Democratic
South. The Voting Rights Act forced courts to reckon with questions of racial representation, but these cases generated a minimum of partisan turnover in the one-party South.404
However, the gradual ideological realignment of the major parties since
Baker v. Carr, accelerated by the Voting Rights Act itself, has since hardened
into the hyperpolarized rivalry between Republicans and Democrats dominating every aspect of today’s national and state politics. Partisan realignment sorted conservatives uniformly into the Republican Party and liberals
into the Democratic Party over forty years to produce major parties that are
ideologically cohesive and more polarized than at any time since the Civil
War.405 Put simply, for the first time in American history, no Democrat in
Congress is as conservative as the most liberal Republican.406 Because ideological preferences filter down from politicians to voters,407 the electorate has
402. David W. Brady, Party Coalitions in the US Congress:: Intra- v. Interparty, in The
Oxford Handbook of American Political Parties and Interest Groups 358, 365 (L.
Sandy Maisel & Jeffrey M. Berry eds., 2010).
403. See generally J. Douglas Smith, On Democracy’s Doorstep: The Inside Story of
How the Supreme Court Brought “One Person, One Vote” to the United States
(2014). It was no wonder why, then, Chief Justice Earl Warren believed that going forward one
person, one vote would ensure that elections “would reflect the collective public interest” and
did not anticipate the subsequent rise of partisan gerrymandering, which was then a limited,
state-specific problem. See G. Edward White, Earl Warren: A Public Life 337 (1982);
Pamela S. Karlan, The Alabama Foundations of the Law of Democracy, 67 Ala. L. Rev. 415,
416–17 (2015).
404. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its
Own Success?, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1710, 1713–14 (2004) (outlining this argument).
405. See Christopher Hare & Keith T. Poole, The Polarization of Contemporary American
Politics, 46 Polity 411, 415–16 (2014). See generally Matthew Levendusky, The Partisan
Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans
(2009).
406. See Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, It’s Even Worse Than It Looks:
How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism 45 (2012).
407. See generally Christopher H. Achen & Larry M. Bartels, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government (2016); Gabriel Lenz,
Follow the Leader?: How Voters Respond to Politicians’ Policies and Performance
(2012).
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increasingly polarized into opposed camps of partisans as well.408 These dynamics of hyperpolarization have removed opportunities for political compromise by differentiating the parties so distinctly from one another.
What is worse, the hyperpolarized parties practice partisan “teamsmanship” where they see their respective fortunes as mutually exclusive and refuse to compromise if it would hand the opposite party any kind of
victory.409 Hostility toward the opposite party now goes beyond ideological
disagreement and carries a personal dimension. For example, half of Republicans and a third of Democrats report that they would displeased if their
child married outside their party, and in an experimental setting, 80 percent
of Republicans and Democrats preferred to reward a scholarship to a candidate from their own party.410 In fact, most partisans prefer to reward their
fellow party members over out-party candidates even when an out-party
candidate has stronger objective credentials.411 Hyperpolarization is so severe
that efforts at bipartisan cooperation are, in Heather Gerken’s words, like
“playing cards in a hurricane.”412
Under these prevailing conditions, it is no surprise that courts today
constantly run up against bolder and new instantiations of government partisanship beyond what courts faced in the 1960s. Today, partisan rivalry between Republicans and Democrats is the singular axis around which all
American politics revolve.413 Even when courts address cases dressed up in
terms of racial representation or voter fraud, they wrestle essentially with
exercises in hyperpolarization that have spilled from the legislature into the
courtroom.414 Yet in court, these cases are still argued in legal terms under
doctrinal frameworks that fail to account for the partisanship that motivates
legislative majorities to regularly exploit their lawmaking authority for party
advantage. The applicable doctrine in these cases from the Voting Rights
Act, one person, one vote, and election administration, among other things,
no longer tracks the actual motivations of the government, which today are
overwhelmingly partisan.415 As Sam Issacharoff explains it, “[C]ourts are
408. See generally Alan Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens,
Polarization, and American Democracy (2010); Levendusky, supra note 405.
409. Frances E. Lee, Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in
the U.S. Senate 47–73 (2009); see also Frances E. Lee, Insecure Majorities: Congress
and the Perpetual Campaign (2016); Mann & Ornstein, supra note 406; Alan I.
Abramowitz & Steven Webster, The Rise of Negative Partisanship and the Nationalization of
U.S. Elections in the 21st Century, 41 Electoral Stud. 12, 21–22 (2016).
410. See Cass R. Sunstein, Partyism, 2015 U. Chi. Legal F. 1, 5–6.
411. See id.
412. Heather K. Gerken, Playing Cards in a Hurricane: Party Reform in an Age of Polarization, 54 Hous. L. Rev. 911 (2017).
413. See generally Pildes, supra note 22.
414. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 Iowa L.
Rev. 131 (2005) (arguing that election law cases often are political disputes where the losers
switch from a legislative forum to the judicial).
415. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 313, at 1406 (arguing, for example, that “the category
of race increasingly fails to capture the primary motivation for what has become a battlefield
in partisan wars”).
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searching for the consequences of partisan excess without being able to ferret out the root cause.”416
The absence of a unified constitutional norm against government partisanship leaves courts doctrinally short-handed to redress hyperpolarization.
Just as the Republican Party systematized a comprehensive national effort
called REDMAP to maximize returns from partisan gerrymandering,417 it
also has coordinated a national effort to press election administration for
partisan gains. The ensuing “Voting Wars” between the parties on election
administration gave rise to widespread state enactment of voter ID laws,
early voting cutbacks, and other restrictions targeting Democratic turnout,
while leaving alone or expanding absentee balloting and other voting access
that advantage Republicans.418 As I describe above, courts have begun to
recognize government partisanship at work and elevated judicial scrutiny
beyond rational basis to respond to the threat.419 Nonetheless, these judicial
efforts suffer from the “odd quality” of rejecting government partisanship
while hesitating to articulate those efforts forthrightly as rejection of partisan overreach.420 Ned Foley advocates that courts justify these efforts in
terms of fair play under what he proposes as a right to legislative due process.421 Sam Issacharoff suggests that courts in these cases follow the model
of antitrust law in developing an emerging new rule of reason for voter welfare.422 These are thoughtful efforts, I think, to recast constitutional law in
sensible new directions to better address hyperpartisanship. My point is that
courts already have developed the right approach to partisanship, albeit in
scattershot form at times explicitly and at times implicitly, that needs foremost to be surfaced and acknowledged as a unifying principle across constitutional law. Courts have been surprisingly consistent in applying this
principle in disparate areas of law, except for the glaring and therefore quite
misleading case of partisan gerrymandering since Vieth. Surfacing the principle is valuable not only for reforming partisan gerrymandering, but also
critical for rationalizing a cohesive judicial response to hyperpolarization in
its novel manifestations.
Explicit recognition of a norm against government partisanship, for instance, would instantly add conceptual clarity to the law of racial gerrymandering. Another odd artifact of courts’ hesitance to explicitly acknowledge
the norm is that state governments are now perversely incentivized to admit
416. Issacharoff, supra note 17, at 324; see also Charles, supra note 309, at 1210–12 (contending that the Court uses racial gerrymandering law to indirectly regulate the excesses of
partisan gerrymandering).
417. See generally Daley, supra note 23.
418. See generally Hasen, supra note 295.
419. See supra Part II.
420. Issacharoff, supra note 17, at 321 (describing the “odd quality to a judicial inquiry
that looks to the effects of partisan desires to curtail voter access to the electoral process but
leaves an unspoken void around the operational motivation”).
421. Foley, supra note 335.
422. Issacharoff, supra note 17, at 301–05.
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their partisan intent as a defense in racial gerrymandering claims. This incentive arose from the Supreme Court’s earlier attempts to exit the morass
of racial gerrymandering claims that swamped it during the 1990s after it
invented a new equal protection challenge to majority-minority districting
in Shaw v. Reno.423 Shaw challenges, brought in the 1990s by Republican
interests against Democratic-majority governments, needed to prove that
race was the “predominant factor” motivating particular redistricting decisions such that it subordinated traditional districting criteria, typically in the
literal form of a misshapen majority-minority district.424 Governments defending against Shaw challenges were therefore incentivized to claim that
their redistricting decisions were motivated instead by political considerations, often specifically partisan ones, to deflect allegations that race
predominated the process.425 In this sense, the Court eventually channeled
the racial gerrymandering claims that preoccupied courts during the 1990s
back toward partisan gerrymandering claims during the 2000s, including
Larios, Vieth, and LULAC as prominent examples. And then Justice Scalia’s
declaration in Vieth that partisanship is an “ordinary and lawful motive”426
for redistricting appeared effectively to carve out a safe harbor for gerrymandering provided the state admitted partisan, rather than racial
motivations.
The Court confronted this odd result in a new generation of racial gerrymandering cases last Term. In Harris v. McCrory, the district court struck
down North Carolina’s congressional redistricting under Shaw after finding
race predominated in the construction of the state’s majority-minority districts.427 The state, however, claimed that it referred to race only for the
compelling interest of complying with the Voting Rights Act,428 and beyond
that purpose, sorted voters by race not for race’s sake, but as a tool for
partisan gerrymandering.429 During the Supreme Court oral argument for
Harris, Justice Kagan jumped straight to this state defense and summarized,
423. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
424. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 917 (1995).
425. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 391, at 71 (“[I]f ‘partisan’ factors predominate in the
legislature then those challenging the proposed district lines lose, but if ‘racial’ factors
predominate they win.”); Issacharoff, supra note 124, at 637 (“The upshot . . . is that so long as
the white majority Democratic legislature was gerrymandering a congressional district to reward its own interests, the Constitution would remain silent.”). Sometimes the government
switches between racial and partisan explanations for its lawmaking depending on the lawsuit.
See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 970 (1996) (plurality opinion) (chiding the state for
defending itself in racial terms against partisan gerrymandering claims and then explaining
itself in partisan terms against racial gerrymandering claims).
426. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 286 (2004) (plurality opinion).
427. 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 610–11 (M.D.N.C. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. Harris, 137
S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
428. Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 614.
429. Similar defenses of party, not race, were raised in defense of voter ID laws against
Voting Rights Act challenges. See, e.g., N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831
F.3d 204, 226 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017); Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d
216, 253 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 62 (2017); One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen,
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“Is it politics or is it race? If it’s politics, it’s fine; if it’s race, it’s not.”430 Of
course, the state’s claim it considered racial data for partisan purposes has
greatest credibility in the South, where racial polarization between white
Republicans and African American Democrats is so intense. When African
Americans vote reliably for Democrats 95 percent of the time, race is a more
reliable proxy for partisanship than party registration.431 In a real sense, all
redistricting here is partisan as the hyperpolarized party in control considers
every redistricting tool in its means to maximize party advantage. The intense partisanship of today’s politics ironically might have meant the state
always has a credible defense to racial gerrymandering. The Court’s reluctance to announce a clear, unifying rule against government partisanship,
most obviously in Vieth, made it difficult to deny this state defense of racial
gerrymandering in cases like Harris.
The oddity of the state defense of party, not race in Shaw cases is fundamentally absurd. It is no better if the government disadvantages minority
voters because they are Democrats than if it does so because they are African
American. To the degree these scenarios are even distinguishable conceptually,432 African American voters lose electoral opportunities either way
from deliberate government efforts to prejudice election outcomes against a
defined subgroup of voters the government disfavors. Under either interpretation of Harris, the North Carolina legislature has narrowly targeted African
American voters for what should be, and often are judicially regarded as,
illegitimate and arbitrary justifications.433 Outside of redistricting, further
away from Vieth’s influence, federal courts already are deciding that discriminating against African American voters in election administration violates
the Voting Rights Act even when done for partisan purposes.434 Still, within
the context of redistricting, the Court had left the door open for partisan

198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 934 (W.D. Wis. 2016), appeal docketed, No. 16-3083 (7th Cir. Aug. 2,
2016); Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 155 F. Supp. 3d 572, 583 (E.D. Va. 2015).
430. Anna Douglas, Supreme Court on NC Gerrymandering: ‘Is It Politics or Is It Race?’,
Charlotte News & Observer (Dec. 5, 2016, 6:48 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/
politics-government/article119055958.html [https://perma.cc/5CUV-EPAF] (quoting Justice
Kagan).
431. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 245 (2001) (noting “white voters registered as Democrats ‘cross-over’ to vote for a Republican candidate more often than do African-Americans, who register and vote Democratic between 95% and 97% of the time”).
432. See, e.g., D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 Harv. L.
Rev. 533, 590–97 (2008) (questioning whether racial motivations can be causally separated
from other political factors).
433. See, e.g., N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 831 F.3d at 214 (striking down as
unconstitutional a series of election administration enactments as discriminatory against African Americans “with almost surgical precision” and which “constitute inapt remedies for
problems assertedly justifying them [or] that did not exist”).
434. See id. at 223; Veasey, 830 F.3d at 272; One Wis. Inst., 198 F. Supp. 3d at 904–05.
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manipulation in Vieth, and thereby permitted leakage for other types of redistricting manipulation to be justified as partisan as well.435 The Court now
has the timely opportunity to unify constitutional law under a coherent prohibition against partisan manipulation across the board.
Conclusion
Before leaving the White House, President Obama had already targeted
redistricting as a personal postpresidency priority. He began organizing a
group, headed by former Attorney General Eric Holder, to mobilize in advance of the 2021 redistricting cycle.436 It was a perfectly rational response by
America’s leading Democrat to two important, related developments. One is
the undeniable fact of hyperpolarization between the major parties that
dominates every aspect of American politics from the national to the local
level.437 The other is masterful organization by Republicans, beating Democrats to the punch, in pouring resources and attention into gerrymandering
as a critical lever in the hyperpolarized partisan fight. Courts are beginning
to respond to the challenges of this hyperpolarized arms race, but judicial
failure thus far to curb partisan gerrymandering is the most glaring exception to the overarching norm against government partisanship. Courts have
wasted more than a decade since Vieth in search of elusive standards to measure excessive partisan effect, when a better approach, focused on the central
role of government partisan purpose, is readily available and more faithful
to larger values of constitutional law. The importance of a judicial check
cannot be overstated when hyperpolarization is so strong that partisans increasingly parrot the party line438 and change their tune accordingly when
the party line abruptly reverses course.439 These are cynical times. The usual
435. In Cooper v. Harris last Term, the Court tried to limit this leakage by noting that
“sorting of voters on the grounds of their race remains suspect even if race is meant to function as a proxy for other (including political) characteristics.” 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1473 n.7 (2017).
436. See Alexander Burns & Jonathan Martin, Eric Holder to Lead Democrats’ Attack on
Republican Gerrymandering, N.Y. Times (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/
11/us/eric-holder-to-lead-democrats-attack-on-republican-gerrymandering.html?_r=0 (on file
with the Michigan Law Review); Edward-Isaac Dovere, Obama, Holder to Lead Post-Trump
Redistricting Campaign, Politico (Oct. 17, 2016) http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/
obama-holder-redistricting-gerrymandering-229868 [https://perma.cc/TKP6-LDVL].
437. Anthony J. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy: The Toxic Mix of Fake News, Hyperpolarization, and Partisan Election Administration, 12 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 57, 75–82
(2017).
438. See, e.g., James N. Druckman et al., How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public
Opinion Formation, 107 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 57 (2013); see also Ariel Malka & Yphtach Lelkes,
In a New Poll, Half of Republicans Say They Would Support Postponing the 2020 Election if
Trump Proposed It, Wash. Post (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/mon
key-cage/wp/2017/08/10/in-a-new-poll-half-of-republicans-say-they-would-support-postponing-the-2020-election-if-trump-proposed-it/ [https://perma.cc/56US-GG63] (reporting that
roughly half of Republicans say they would support postponing the 2020 election if Republican leadership proposed a delay to ensure only eligible American citizens can vote).
439. See, e.g., Dina Smeltz, Republicans Used to Fear Russians. Here’s What They Think
Now, Wash. Post (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/
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political remedies from a less partisan era no longer apply as they once
might have. When partisanship is its own justification, both as a political
and constitutional matter, it is hard to imagine the major parties walking
back from further partisan escalation without judicial intervention.

2017/02/16/republicans-used-to-fear-russians-heres-what-they-think-now/ [https://perma.cc/
3XF7-SBEF] (describing a rapid reversal of Republican attitudes about Russia to mirror newly
elected President Donald Trump’s views).

